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Executive Summary 
his study finds that the global financial instability was mainly 
determined by unstable macroeconomic policies in the major 
economies and currency areas of the world, with lax regulation of 
financial markets in general playing the role of a permissive factor.  
The urgent task at this juncture is to stabilise financial markets and 
halt the poisonous spiral of lower asset prices depressing economic activity, 
which in turn is pushing asset prices even lower. The central question is 
how to restore confidence in the banking system. To this end, the 
deployment of government money into insolvent banks should be 
accompanied by a straight takeover by the state, a restructuring phase and 
resale to private investors as soon as possible.  
The arsenal of crisis-management tools available to the European 
Central Bank are narrower than that of other major central banks because, 
unlike the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, the European Central 
Bank is not backed by a fiscal authority. One way to tackle this weakness 
without undermining the ECB’s independence would be to create a 
European Fund which would issue Eurobonds and make the proceeds 
available to European institutions for their financial rescue operations.  
Once the crisis subsides, the world will need new monetary 
arrangements whereby external payment imbalances are corrected by 
appropriate domestic policies and exchange rates can vary consistently 
with the requirements of international adjustment. Agreement on restoring 
external discipline on national policies of all countries will not come about 
unless the main emerging economies can take their proper place alongside 
the industrialised countries in the world’s governing institutions.  
T ii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Lax financial market regulation has allowed leverage of financial 
organisations to build up to unsustainable levels. In our view, there is no 
need to fundamentally change the regulatory architecture whereby 
prudential regulation basically concerns banking institutions. Non-bank 
intermediaries, including private pools of capital, do not pose systemic 
stability risks unless they are financed cheaply by banks with depositors’ 
money; to the extent that this is avoided, it is not necessary to extend 
prudential regulation beyond the banking system. There is also no need to 
return to a system of legal separation between commercial and investment 
banking, provided there are sufficient disincentives and penalties for banks 
to engage in capital market activities on their own account. 
Our main advice on banking capital requirements is to scrap Basle II 
rules and replace them with a flat capital requirement calculated with 
reference to total assets, with no exemptions: the maximum permitted 
leverage ratio should never again be allowed to exceed a ceiling of ten.  
We also suggest a number of measures designed to strengthen risk 
management within financial organisations as well as transparency of 
information on all market participants and financial instruments. 
Appropriate incentives should push OTC instruments to migrate to 
organised clearing platforms. 
In Europe, a drastic simplification of the regulatory structure is in 
order to concentrate at EU level not only rule-making, which in the main 
has already been accomplished, but also rule implementation, as was 
argued by the de Larosière Group. More specifically, it is high time that 
Level Three Committees be given legal powers in coordinating the 
implementation of EU directives. 
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Introduction 
Since October 2008, stock markets have fallen by over 50% and the process 
of deleveraging in financial markets has hit the real economy worldwide, 
with sharp declines in aggregate demand, trade and output. While policy-
makers are still struggling to stabilise financial markets and halt the fall in 
economic activity, the discussion is raging about what went wrong and 
what changes are needed in policies and financial market rules in order to 
avoid a repetition of these disastrous events. 
With diagnoses of the crisis still diverging widely, disgruntled 
citizens whose jobs are at risk and taxpayers who have been asked to foot 
the bill are pressuring parliaments to punish the bankers and impose tight 
constraints on capital markets; think tanks and advocacy groups are trying 
to occupy the high ground of policy advice by elaborating long lists of new 
rules to correct equally long lists of alleged market failures. Politicians are 
looking for scapegoats to be thrown to the public to hide their own failures 
in keeping the financial industry under check. Political economists point to 
the favourable conditions for acting now with the lobbying power of the 
financial services industry severely curtailed. In sum, there is a real danger 
that a host of poorly conceived new rules will cripple capital markets, limit 
investment flows and damage the recovery of economic activity.  
In reality, what is urgent is to halt the vicious circle of falling asset 
prices and mounting losses by financial organisations aggravating the 
credit crunch and generating more bad economic news that will feed into a 
further round of falling asset prices. Writing new rules for financial 
markets is less urgent since their depressed state makes an immediate 
return to the destabilising practices of the boom phase highly unlikely. 
Moreover, under pressure from shareholders and regulators, financial 2 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
organisations are already introducing measures of their own to address 
some of the flaws in risk control and management incentives that resulted 
in massive destruction of their capital. 
Therefore, policy-makers and regulators should not rush to enact new 
rules, but rather embark on a thorough review of the regulatory 
architecture and arrive at considered conclusions on what needs to be 
changed. The new rules should put a brake on irresponsible lending and 
speculation but also preserve the benefits of open and flexible capital 
markets. 
This study addresses some main themes in the ongoing debate on 
financial reform with a view to clarifying and simplifying the policy and 
regulatory issues before us. Financial instability has been brought about 
first and foremost by destabilising macro-financial policies, notably in the 
United States, against the background of persistent imbalances in 
international payments leading to a massive accumulation of financial 
assets and liabilities worldwide (section 1). Hence, there is little doubt that 
the problem will persist until we can bring some international discipline to 
bear on the main players regarding their monetary, fiscal and exchange rate 
policies. In this context Europe could draw substantial benefits from an 
enhanced international role of the euro, but this depends upon its 
willingness to issue Union bonds in large quantities (section 6). It remains 
to be seen whether the severe recession engendered by the financial market 
crash will lead to a greater willingness to cooperate internationally, or will 
result instead in a breakdown of cooperation and the proliferation of 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies, as happened in the 1930s. 
Recognising the paramount role of macro-policies does not imply that 
financial regulation and supervision do not need overhauling. Financial 
organisations have displayed a systemic tendency to over-leverage their 
capital and take excessive risks, pointing to fundamental distortions in 
incentives: in essence, a skewed distribution of returns from risk-taking in 
which large gains are accrued to management and shareholders, while 
large losses are partly or wholly borne by public budgets and taxpayers. As 
rewards grew larger with rising stock markets, financial innovation was 
increasingly used to circumvent legal capital requirements and hide risk 
exposure – sometimes even to the governing bodies of the intermediaries 
themselves. Excessive risk-taking was favoured by loopholes in the 
regulatory system worldwide, an inadequate design of capital 
requirements and the lack of transparency in financial products and risk 
exposure (section 2). KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 3 
 
Section 3 addresses crisis management in the main countries and the 
ongoing debate on how to halt falling asset prices and mounting losses of 
financial organisations. A main conclusion is that financial market 
stabilisation may well require not only much larger resources for capital 
injections in distressed intermediaries, but outright nationalisation of 
troubled banks in order to avoid writing yet more blank cheques with 
taxpayers’ money. This section also calls attention to institutional 
limitations of the European Central Bank (ECB) that might limit its ability 
to maintain credit flows to end-users of funds or to handle the failure of a 
large bank.  
Section 4 discusses two fundamental issues in the new regulatory 
structure on which preliminary decisions must be made. First, should 
commercial and investment banking activities be legally separated once 
again, as they once were under the Glass-Steagall Act, or can we live with 
the system of large universal banks which now also prevails in the United 
States, following the demise of Wall Street investment banks? Second, 
should the new regulatory structure be organised by institution, e.g. for 
banks, insurance companies, private pools of capital; or should it rather be 
organised by objectives, with separate authorities taking care of macro-
prudential (system) stability, micro-prudential supervision, and 
transparency and investor protection? A s  w i l l  b e  s e e n ,  w e  f a v o u r  t h i s  
second solution, which is also more liable to result in a rapid concentration 
at EU level of regulatory and supervisory powers. Finally, section 5 is 
devoted to the key ingredients of micro-prudential regulation: capital 
requirements, management incentives and disclosure. Our main thesis is 
that – while indeed no financial organisation of systemic relevance should 
escape appropriate public monitoring – there is no need to regulate every 
market or financial activity where there is evidence of market failures. On 
the contrary, a limited number of measures concentrated on banks, which 
enjoy the benefits of deposit insurance, together with enhanced 
transparency obligations for other financial intermediaries, can do the job. 
The main change that we propose is to scrap the Basle II framework for 
regulatory capital and substitute it with a total capital ratio calculated with 
reference to a bank’s overall balance sheet. Our main proposals are 
summarised in section 7. 4 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
1.  The macro-policy faults 
By all possible metrics, the last three decades have seen prices in the main 
asset markets massively and unprecedentedly deviating from 
‘fundamental’ economic values. At their peak in December 1999, the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 shares stood at 44 times the average yearly earnings, 
the highest ever, well above the excesses of 1929; after the burst of the 
dot.com bubble, the ratio fell but only to around the peak of 1929 (Figure 1). 
When stock prices tumbled, housing prices accelerated sharply, eventually 
peaking in 2006: at that point, they had almost doubled relative to 1996, in 
the most dramatic housing boom in American history. Meanwhile, the total 
indebtedness of the US economy surpassed 350% of GDP, mostly owed by 
the private sector, i.e. about 290%, of which over 100% pertained to 
households (or 140% of their disposable income). 
Although equally long time series are not available for all countries, 
there is little doubt that similar patterns prevailed in the main asset 
markets worldwide. Residential property prices hit record highs in most 
countries – the exceptions being Germany, Japan and Switzerland, where 
property markets had boomed in earlier decades. Stock prices rose very 
strongly in advanced countries and spectacularly in emerging economies. 
Some advanced countries recorded house prices and private debt increases 
larger than in the United States, e.g. the United Kingdom (where total debt 
rose above 450% of GDP and household debt to over 170% of disposable 
income), Ireland and Spain, and Japan in the 1980s (where stock prices 
increased six-fold and house prices ten-fold over a decade before crashing 
early in the 1990s). 
If a ‘speculative bubble’ is defined as an unsustainable price increase 
– with un-sustainability confirmed by the subsequent crash – not only have 
we witnessed in sequence the greatest asset price bubbles in history, but 
also in 2006 the first-ever global housing and stock price bubble. 
Once asset prices started to decline, it became apparent that Wall 
Street investment banks and the banking system worldwide had built up 
during the long upswing an unsustainable leverage and risk exposure, and 
furthermore that they were tightly interconnected by a thick web of 
interbank, investment and derivative transactions that acted as powerful 
amplifiers in spreading the contagion between markets and intermediaries. 
The decision to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt on 15 September 2008, 
detonated a banking crisis that had in all likelihood become inevitable, 
once the scramble for deleveraging got under way (Brunnermeier, 2009, 
The Economist, 2008, Morris, 2008 and  Schinasi, 2006). KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 5 
 
Figure 1. Asset prices and price earnings ratios in the United States, 1900-2008 
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Annual data. For stock price index value for 2008 as of December.  
Data sources: Authors’ own calculations based on Shiller 2009 for stock price, real home price 
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Now that mayhem has struck, the key policy question is how to make 
it unlikely that it will happen again without forsaking the benefits of open 
and integrated financial markets. To this end, it is of help to review recent 
events in light of historical precedents of asset price and banking crises that 
fortunately are available in abundance (see especially Chancellor, 1999, 
Galbraith, 1954 and 1993, Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2008a and b and Shiller, 2005 and 2008). 
One main finding in that literature is that a steep run-up in stock and 
housing prices is the best leading indicator of an impending banking crisis 
and related economic recession (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008b; cf. also 
International Monetary Fund, 2008b): this was the case in the United States 
in 1873 and the late 1920s, and again in the numerous banking crises of the 
last three decades in Japan and East Asia, Russia and the Nordic European 
countries. Moreover, all episodes that may be characterised as ‘asset price 
bubbles’ or ‘manias’ were preceded by credit booms, as a result of some 
combination of loosening monetary policy, large capital inflows from 
abroad and financial deregulation and innovation (Kindleberger & Aliber, 
2005 and Eichengreen & Mitchener, 2003). Financial innovation is relevant 
here for its effects on the aggregate supply of credit, rather than its specific 
impact on leverage or the distribution of risk in the financial system.  
In its annual reports, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has 
called attention to loose monetary policy, notably in the United States, as 
the prime mover of asset inflation (Bank for International Settlements, 
2008). Indeed, standard measures of monetary stance indicate that US 
monetary policy was mostly accommodating in the 1990s, after the mild 
recession at the beginning of the decade, and aggressively expansionary in 
the 2000s. Between mid-2003 and mid-2004, federal fund rates were kept 
well below inflation (Figure 2), an event unseen since the unstable 1970s. 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2008b) speculate that this aggressive expansion can 
explain the higher increase in housing prices observed in the United States 
relative to average behaviour in the run-up to five ‘big’ banking crises in 
advanced countries during the past three decades. 
In the view of the BIS, low interest rates on longer maturities – an 
outcome that was attributed in official circles to the anti-inflation 
credentials of the Federal Reserve – in fact owed a lot to positive supply 
shocks related to globalisation that muted inflation (see also International 
Monetary Fund, 2006) and depressed investment demand in continental 
Europe and Japan. In addition, larger a n d  l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  i n  U S  c u r r e n t  
external payments found their counterpart in capital inflows.  KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 7 
 
Figure 2. US inflation rate and selected dollar interest rates 
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Figure 3. US balance of payments, official reserves and real effective exchange rate (REER), 1996-2008 
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These inflows were mainly from Asia, which directly lowered interest 
rates in US markets’ long maturities (on this see Wolf, 2009). Risk premia 
on corporate bonds and equity also fell to historically low levels, as 
investors’ perceptions of the future became ever rosier. This view has been 
shared by the European Central Bank, which argued in a policy study 
published in 2005: “major asset-price escalations can be encouraged by lax 
monetary conditions which are not immediately reflected in an increase in 
price inflation.” 
An alternative view based on investors’ psychology has been offered 
by Robert Shiller: he argues that, after a long period of benign economic 
environment and increasing capital gains on their assets – as indeed was 
the case in 1982-1999 – investors start basing their decisions on the actions 
of others, rather than their own independent information, because “they 
feel that everyone else simply couldn’ t  b e  w r o n g ” ,  i n  a n  a t m o s p h e r e  i n 
which price increases feed back into further price increases and from time 
to time produce a speculative bubble. Schiller’s regular surveys of investor 
sentiment (Shiller, 2005) confirm the gradual convergence of investors’ 
opinions along with rising asset prices. He doesn’t deny that monetary 
policy was too loose, but maintains that it cannot be seen as the exogenous 
cause of the real estate boom, because the Federal Reserve was prey to the 
same delusion gripping private investors, and “honestly saw the home-
price increases as continuing indefinitely” (Shiller, 2008, p. 47).  
Certainly, by the late 1990s the Federal Reserve had become a hostage 
of the financial markets, which maintained a strong expectation that 
declines in asset prices would be countered by monetary expansion: but 
this should rather be seen primarily as a result of its own past record. 
Indeed, the increased frequency of changes in policy rates in the late 1990s 
and 2000s – seven times in 1997-99 and 43 times in this decade – reveals a 
growing short-term orientation of policy; the old wisdom whereby 
monetary policy must tread carefully, due to its potent lagged effects, 
seems to have been forgotten. 
In this connection, Morris (2008) reproduces some excerpts from “an 
influential investment newsletter” (dated August 2007), as follows:  
… [After the stock market crash of 1987] there were widespread fears that 
the big banks might be in trouble and that a credit crunch would follow … In 
response the Fed cut interest rates three times in six weeks. The US economy 
continued to grow, stocks recovered to new highs. … 10 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
The 1998 stock market plunge saw the S&P 500 dive … of course we were 
headed for serious recession. In response the Fed cut interest rates three times in 
seven weeks … In 1999 and 2000 the US and global economies recorded their 
strongest growth in a decade … 
The 2001 recession, worsened by the 9/11 attacks, sparked many concerns … 
about a credit crunch. As a result, the Fed cut rates three times in seven weeks. 
There was no serious credit crunch … (pp. 64-65) 
Thus, the Fed’s behaviour was well recognised by investors and 
market agents and duly incorporated into their expectations. Following the 
2003-04 monetary expansion, Wall Street bankers commonly spoke of a 
‘Greenspan put’ as their insurance against stock market declines. They 
were convinced that the Federal Reserve “does not appear to believe there 
can be an excessive level of monetary growth, credit creation or asset 
inflation … [while] they do … believe there can be an unacceptably low 
level of all these variables” (Cooper, 2008, p. 24) and that, as a result, their 
responses to monetary and credit developments had become asymmetric 
and bent towards loose money. 
Another constant feature in the run-up to financial bubbles – which 
was recognised by Galbraith (1954) in his account of the events leading to 
the 1929 stock market crash – was an increasingly skewed distribution of 
income, with wages stagnating and profits and financial incomes taking up 
an ever-growing share of GDP. In the United States in 2007, the share of 
wages and salaries in GDP was the lowest ever recorded since the 1950s; 
everywhere in the advanced world real wages have stagnated and even 
declined in the past two decades, under the constant pressure of 
delocalisation of manufacturing and technological change, making 
unskilled labour redundant (Turner, 2008). Thus, while capitalism was in 
full flower, working classes were under the increasing strains of declining 
incomes and weakening social protection (Frieden, 2006). More important, 
this development has become a major factor in shaping national economic 
performances and the structure of international payments; it has also been 
a key ingredient in feeding liquidity to stock markets and expectations of 
ever-increasing profits, on one hand, and unsustainable private debt on the 
other.  
In some advanced countries – including Japan and Germany, 
Switzerland and Nordic European countries – consumption demand 
stagnated and growth was sustained by net exports, leading to large KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 11 
 
external surpluses and slow overall growth. Elsewhere, notably the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain,1 the shortfall in real income 
and domestic demand was offset by easy credit for the purchase of housing 
that generated construction booms and, thanks to rising (nominal) wealth, 
high consumption growth; personal savings rates declined sharply – 
turning even negative in the United States– and household indebtedness 
was pushed to unsustainable levels. As in the 1920s, the final phase of the 
upswing saw an explosion of irresponsible lending, helped by financial 
innovations such as consumer loans and credit cards in the 1920s, and sub-
prime mortgages in the 2000s. 
Meanwhile, rising profits and financial incomes contributed to 
boosting the demand for financial assets – encouraged by reductions in 
taxation of high incomes and capital gains – further feeding the increase in 
stock prices; in turn, rising stock prices imparted an additional push to the 
consumption spree through the wealth effect. The Economist has calculated 
that 40% of profits in the US economy in 2007 were coming from the 
financial sector, which represented at that time only about 10% of total 
value added. Thus, not only external payment imbalances were a reflection 
of enormous domestic imbalances, but these domestic imbalances were also 
directly instrumental in the generation of asset price booms through their 
effects on consumption and asset demand.  
Turning to the international dimension of the financial turmoil, in 
retrospect the maelstrom that has devastated financial markets appears as 
the culmination of repeated bouts of financial instability, following the 
demise of Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates, that had their cause in 
growing external payments imbalances – in turn generated by changing 
patterns of net savings and investment inside the major economic areas. 
These imbalances have kept international markets awash with liquidity in 
search of returns, with strong destabilising effects. 
Kindleberger & Aliber (2005) identify four distinct asset price bubbles 
from the second half of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s: in Japan (late 
1980s), the Nordic European countries (early 1990s), South East Asia and 
the United States (late 1990s); they were not yet aware of the fifth, the US 
                                                      
1 The same had happened in Japan in the 1980s, where however most of the 
borrowing for real estate investment was by banks and corporations; see 
Kindleberger & Aliber (2005). 12 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
housing bubble in the 2000s. Before this sequence, asset bubbles had been a 
rare event; therefore, to have experienced so many over such a short time-
span clearly points to a systematic relationship among them. 
Thus, these authors describe how the US deficit of the 1970s fed the 
Japanese ballooning financial surplus in the 1980s and ignited the asset 
price boom in that country; how the asset price increases in Japan fed a 
massive expansion abroad of Japanese bank lending, that found ready 
outlet in Nordic countries where foreign borrowing by domestic banks had 
just been liberalised; how the outflow of funds from Tokyo, after the 
implosion of the bubble, fed a new bubble in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, 
Jakarta and Hong Kong; how, following the financial crisis in South East 
Asia (and Russia), the dot.com bubble was fed by large capital inflows from 
Asia to New York – where the Federal Reserve had just managed to stop 
the fallout of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) failure by 
cajoling Wall Street investment banks to come to the rescue and pump-
printing money to support stock prices. 
Shocked by the crisis, East Asian countries started to accumulate 
foreign exchange reserves by running ever-larger surpluses in their 
external payments; this money was by and large invested in dollar assets, 
available in ample supply – unlike assets denominated in euro, whose 
supply is constrained by the lack of an EU Treasury able to issue Union 
sovereign debt.  
In the early 2000s once again the United States embarked upon 
strongly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Demand growth 
accelerated worldwide, leading eventually – as in 1972-73 – to a sharp rise 
in oil and commodity prices that further fuelled international payments 
imbalances. In 2006 the US deficit reached an unprecedented 6% of GDP; its 
main counterpart was the accumulation of dollar assets by Asian countries 
and, after the surge in oil prices later in the decade, by oil exporters. As 
international investors grew worried about the accumulation of US foreign 
debt, the dollar started to depreciate and official dollar reserves began to 
snowball, as a reflection of mounting foreign exchange interventions by 
Asian countries trying to slow the descent of the dollar, thus amplifying 
and spreading worldwide the US monetary expansion (Figure 3). 
Finally, the three decades under consideration have seen a protracted 
concentration of banking crises, some in connection with the imploding 
bubbles that have been recalled, and others with a life of their own. As may 
be seen in Figure 4, replicated from Reinhart & Rogoff (2008b), the share of 
countries with ongoing banking crises was abnormally high for over two KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 13 
 
decades, from 1980 to 2000, plunged at the beginning of this decade into 
what can be seen with hindsight as the lull before the storm, and has risen 
sharply since 2008, with a new peak expected for 2009. These crises also 
happened in waves, pointing again to common shocks and strong 
international linkages (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005 and Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2008b): in the beginning of the 1980s, when the Volcker monetary crunch 
exposed the credit excesses of the previous decade in euro-dollar loans to 
the developing countries and the savings and loans industry in the United 
States; the beginning of the 1990s in Latin America and the Nordic 
countries; the late 1990s in South East Asia and Russia; and finally the 
United States in 2007-09. 
In all these instances the banking systems collapsed after several 
years of reckless credit expansion – up to 30% per year over several years – 
with no apparent consideration by lenders of the potential risks of 
insolvency. Another constant feature is that, in the final phase before the 
crash, credit was generously extended also to meet debt service obligations 
that debtors were no longer able to honour.  
Figure 4. Share of countries (%) with banking and debt crises, 1900-2008 
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Banking crises were often associated with currency crises and 
sovereign debt insolvencies, which did not deter further lending sprees 
shortly afterwards: thus, Argentina and Mexico went twice into default on 
their sovereign debt. When banking crises hit the periphery of world 
capital markets, Western banks were basically spared significant losses on 
their international lending thanks to the intervention of their governments 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the economies of the 
countries concerned were left to bear costs amounting sometimes to very 
large shares of their GDP. When the crisis hit home, as it did in the US 
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, the costs were borne by taxpayers.  
It may also be seen from Figure 4 that in the 1920s the wave of 
banking crises was followed by a wave of sovereign debt crises with a lag 
of several years. While World War II probably played a role in the 
increased number of sovereign defaults, the long depression of economic 
activity was central to this development. This is not a good omen for the 
future, should the current fall in activity and trade be followed by a 
prolonged depression.    
In sum, since the end of fixed exchange rates, large actors in the 
global economy have behaved independently as if no external constraint 
existed, but the combination of their actions has produced an unsustainable 
pattern of international payments. The resulting flows of capital have 
proved strongly destabilising, generating a wave of excessive asset price 
increases and credit booms worldwide, until eventually the entire 
construction collapsed under the weight of unsustainable debt.  
If monetary laxity was a main culprit in the story, international 
bankers compounded the mess with their apparent belief that the bonanza 
could continue indefinitely, despite accumulated evidence of increasing 
fragility. This calls attention to the nature of financial innovation and the 
inherent instability of banking, to which we now turn. 
2.  Regulation, innovation and financial instability 
When asset prices burst, there is always an abundance of technical 
explanations pointing to ‘what is different’, i.e. specific technical features of 
market functioning or financial instruments that are identified as the 
culprits. Thus, the 1987 market crash in New York was explained by 
portfolio insurance and automatic selling; in the dot.com bubble of the late 
1990s it was some buccaneering tycoons who engineered gigantic frauds; 
this time round it is exotic financial instruments such as collateralised debt KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 15 
 
obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs), and rating agencies 
that misled risk managers, admittedly to massive scale. ‘What is different’ 
is the preferred approach of financiers, who thus manage to circumscribe 
the responsibilities for the losses incurred by investors and can continue to 
play the same game. Politicians and regulators also like it very much since 
it offers up easy scapegoats they can toss to the public – tax havens, hedge 
funds, derivative products – and diverts their attention from the role 
played by conniving legislation and supervision.  
However, only by concentrating our attention on ‘what is the same’ – 
i.e. on the common features that reappear in each financial crisis – can we 
hope to identify the specific regulatory failures that made it possible this 
time, and thus build adequate policy remedies. 
Two premises should be stated from the start. First, in financial 
markets there is a constant game whereby banks and other agents innovate 
to circumvent regulation and boost returns by taking greater risks, and 
regulators tighten the screws to moderate risk-taking. Innovation 
accelerates when expected gains are larger, that is normally when inflation 
accelerates – be it for wages, manufactured goods prices or asset prices: 
here lies the fundamental microeconomic link between financial instability 
and macro-financial policies. Without unstable macroeconomic policies, the 
likelihood of financial instability is reduced because the pace of financial 
innovation is slower and regulators are better able to adapt their rules so as 
to prevent excessive risk-taking in the financial system. As a consequence, 
we should not overburden financial regulation with the task of preventing 
the consequences of unstable macro-financial policies, since this would lead 
to very restrictive rules, including the outright prohibition of many useful 
financial activities.  
Second, there is overwhelming evidence that free banking – 
essentially, the possibility to offer freely to the public financial instruments 
redeemable on demand at par, and make money by extending credit not 
redeemable at sight to companies and individuals – is unstable, i.e. likely to 
lead to credit booms and busts and bank runs, due to a combination of 
private incentives to over-lend and asymmetric information on the quality 
of loans (Conant, 1909, Cooper, 2008, De Grauwe, 2008, Eichengreen, 1999, 
Galbraith, 1993 and Minsky, 2008). This is what explains historically the 
need to obtain a licence for the exercise of banking and the existence of 
central banks providing liquidity support to banks, deposit insurance to 
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banks don’t assume excessive risks. However, the very existence of these 
apparatuses encourages excessive risk-taking by the bankers, who expect to 
be rescued from their mistakes by monetary authorities, and insufficient 
monitoring of their banks by depositors who feel that their deposits are safe 
anyway (Rochet, 2008). Therefore, the policies designed to stabilise banking 
systems are themselves a source of instability, notably when individual 
banks are ‘too large to fail’, owing to the disruptive effects that would 
result from their failure for the entire financial system and the economy. 
Complex structures were also used to leverage risk-taking on a 
regulated business. This is apparent in the high leverage of large cross-
border banks in Europe, as will be discussed later. Similarly, AIG banked 
on its Triple-A rating, built on a solid insurance business and under serious 
regulatory oversight, to embark after a point in risky but highly profitable 
games, such as massive issuance of CDSs, using for the purpose its holding 
company, which basically escaped all supervision. And so did scores of the 
so-called ‘monoline’ insurers in the United States. 
Since the start of the crisis, the regulatory safe harbour has been used 
to stabilise troubled institutions: thus, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
turned themselves into bank holding companies, able to attract a stable 
deposit base under the umbrella of deposit insurance, once their survival as 
stand-alone businesses came under threat. Similarly, the German 
authorities encouraged the purchase of Postbank by Deutsche Bank to 
provide the latter with a larger deposit base over which to spread the risk 
of its bloated investment banking business.  
Moral hazard due to regulation is compounded by certain features of 
financial markets that further distort incentives and increase the potential 
for instability. The mathematician Mandelbrot (2004) showed that asset 
returns not only ‘have memory’, that is, they are serially correlated and not 
independent over time – as rational expectation theorists2 had claimed – 
but also that their distribution is characterised by ‘fat tails’ of disastrous 
events that happen at discontinuous intervals. This specificity of asset 
return distribution was an important factor in creating ’free options’ for 
bankers and traders, whereby they kept on riding the market tide and 
hiding the rising risks of their businesses, while taking ever-larger pay, 
until their banks and the system at large blew up. As Taleb put it, “you 
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earn a stream of steady bonuses for seven or eight years, then, when the 
loss takes place, you are not asked to disburse anything ... thus the 
incentive is to engage in risks that explode rarely, after a period of steady 
gains”.3 As a result of reckless strategies built on this anomaly, much of the 
financial industry is now in ruin.4  
While history has confirmed these simple truths over and over again, 
memory in financial markets is short and people are always eager to repeat 
the same mistakes in the hope of large gains; and regulators are equally 
likely as the public at large to fall prey to waves of optimism generated by a 
benign economic environment (Chancellor, 1999, Galbraith, 1954 and 1993 
and Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). They are encouraged by economists 
ready to argue that past instability was due to specific policy mistakes (as 
Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, famously did in their monetary history for 
the Great Depression; see Temin, 1991, for a confutation) or particular 
market structures (as Calomiris, 2000, who argued that unit banking was 
the culprit in the wave of banking crises in the 19th century in the United 
States) or, more fundamentally, that private incentives are sufficient to 
keep bankers honest (Kroszner & Rajan, 1997).  
There are three main ingredients to every speculative bubble. The 
first ingredient is excessive leverage of equity capital: before the recent 
crisis leverage climbed to well above 30 times capital, on average, for both 
Wall Street investment banks and the large European cross-border banks, 
with peaks over 50 (Table 1). A large share of liabilities was very short 
term, increasingly coming from the wholesale money market – with 
growing interdependence between banks rapidly spreading contagion.5 
 
 
 
                                                      
3 N.N. Taleb, “How bank bonuses let us all down”, Financial Times, 25 February 
2009. 
4 On the failure of specific strategies of the main actors in the financial industry, see 
J. Plender, “Error-laden machine”, Financial Times, 3 March 2009. 
5 This feature of the recent crisis, i.e. the paramount role of the collapse in the 
wholesale money market, likens it, at least in its initial phase, to the 1866 crisis in 
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Table 1. Leverage and short-term liabilities of selected financial institutions, 2007 
Institution Total 
assets/equity* 
Deposits and short-term 
funding/total assets (%) 
ABN Amro  33  78 
Bank of America  12  73 
Barclays 38  71 
Bear Stearns  34  13 
BNP Paribas  29  79 
Citigroup 19  66 
Credit Suisse  24  55 
Deutsche Bank  53  80 
Goldman Sachs  22  16 
HSBC 17  74 
JPMorgan Chase  13  68 
Lehman Brothers  31  19 
Merrill Lynch  32  29 
Morgan Stanley  33  30 
RBS 21  75 
Société Générale  34  70 
UBS 52  91 
Avg. EU banks  33 75 
Avg. US banks 
(excl. investment banks) 
14 69 
Avg. US investment banks  30 22 
* Leverage is higher if goodwill is excluded in calculating the ratio.  
Data source: Bankscope, 2008. 
The build-up of excessive leverage was helped in the United States by 
regulatory changes in 2004, which while introducing a Basle-type capital 
requirement (10% of risk-weighted assets), removed pre-existing limits on 
leverage for broker dealers;6 a n d  i n  E u r o p e  b y  t h e  B a s l e  c a p i t a l  
requirements that allowed substantial savings of regulatory capital through 
various risk-mitigation strategies, including purchases of structured 
products with high ratings and assets-insurance with CDSs. As may be 
seen from Table 1, the large American commercial banks, which were 
subject to a minimum total capital/assets ratio, normally showed lower 
leverage ratios, while large cross-border banks in Europe had leverage 
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ratios similar to those of Wall Street investment banks. Citigroup, the most 
troubled US commercial bank, had a leverage ratio close to 20, while Bank 
of America, with a much lower leverage, only got in trouble after it was 
cajoled by the authorities into taking over Merrill Lynch. Goldman Sachs, 
the Wall Street investment bank that weathered the storm better than 
others, was less leveraged than its competitors. 
Rising leverage was the key to ever-growing returns. According to a 
Wall Street Journal comment,7 between 2003 and 2007 the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 companies spent $1.7 trillion to purchase their equity back – the 
most colossal stock market manipulation in history – generating enormous 
gains on management stock options. Share buy-backs by Citigroup, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley in 2006-07 amounted 
to $34 billion; when market conditions turned sour, they were unable to get 
the capital back from private investors and had to turn for support to the 
state. 
Market research has shown over and over again that superior 
performance of private equity was often nothing more than a reflection of 
leveraging a small capital investment. In November 2006, Citibank 
published a research report highlighting how private equity returns could 
be achieved by just leveraging basic stock market indices by three to one; at 
that time leverage on private equity deals was in fact rising to four, five and 
even six to one unit of capital.8 Chancellor (1999) and Morris (2008) 
describe quite a few famous leveraged buy-out deals that would not even 
ensure ex-ante payment of interest, which was to be covered by additional 
debt issues. So much for the superior quality of management generating 
ever-larger values for their shareholders.  
The second constant ingredient of speculative bubbles is lending on 
collateral with tiny margins of own invested capital: these loans in the 
1920s were referred to as ‘call loans’ since the bank may ask for their 
reimbursement at any time; hence, they swell and shrink strictly in line 
with the value of collaterals. When the price of assets placed with the bank 
or broker as collateral increases, credit is plentiful at declining interest rates 
                                                      
7 W. Lazonick, “Everyone is paying the price for share buy backs”, Financial Times, 
26 September 2008. 
8 M. Gordon, “The private equity boom was a clumsy trick”, Financial Times, 1 
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and the borrower can keep on placing new bets; but when asset prices start 
to fall and the credit is recalled, asset sales aggravate the plunge in asset 
prices and may lead to their market seizing and becoming totally illiquid. 
At that point the borrower is broken and the lender must take the losses. 
This mechanism was a major amplifier of asset price falls in every financial 
crisis, powerfully contributing to the perverse feed-back of asset sales 
leading to ever-growing asset sales. The snowball soon hits also the assets 
of the best quality, since these are precisely those that remain saleable when 
prices start to fall across the board (Cooper, 2008). 
Both in the 1920s and earlier this decade, in the United States a major 
component of credit on collateral was represented by mortgage loans: 
homeowners were invited to continue to borrow against rising values of 
their homes well beyond their capacity to service the loans, in the belief 
that they could always resell the house at rising prices. Two government-
sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, added powerful 
steam to the bubble by repurchasing or guaranteeing huge quantities of 
low-quality mortgages, in response to political pressure (Morris, 2008 and 
Shiller, 2008).  
The third constant component of speculative bubbles is the creation 
of off-balance-sheet vehicles to raise money free of capital requirements 
and invest it in speculative assets: these vehicles were called trusts in the 
1920s, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and conduits in modern times 
(Chancellor, 1999 and Galbraith, 1954). Their main feature is that they 
combine the marvels of leverage with those of borrowing on collateral; they 
were the essential vehicle for the new originate-to-distribute model, 
whereby loans would be instantly securitised by originating banks and 
passed on to their investment vehicles, who funded their purchases in the 
wholesale money market, typically by issuing short-maturity asset-backed 
commercial paper or other asset-backed securities. 
Banks earned interest income while apparently getting rid of all risk 
and sparing regulatory capital, and obtained plentiful cheap funds by 
packaging their lending into asset-backed securities. Sponsoring banks 
were explicitly or implicitly committed to providing liquidity backing to 
conduits and SIVs, although these guarantees were not visible in their 
balance sheets thanks to accounting or other gimmicks. The most important 
implication was that, while securitisation was supposed to help disperse 
risk, in fact it was concentrating it with some major financial institutions, as 
became painfully clear as soon as wholesale money markets seized up. 
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like commodities, the quality of credit was no longer effectively monitored 
since incentives often tied originators’ revenues to volume rather than 
quality. Credit enhancement by financial guarantors contributed to the 
perception of unlimited high-quality investment opportunities; credit 
default swaps and related index markets made credit risk easier to trade 
and hedge. The easy availability of credit and rising asset prices 
contributed to low default rates and credit risk premia (Financial Stability 
Forum, 2008a, International Monetary Fund, 2008a, HM Government, 2009 
and Morris, 2008). 
An especially brilliant contribution of financial technology was to 
turn securitisation into a factory of secure high returns, built on top of ever-
shakier underlying loans. The miracle – equivalent to the biblical 
multiplication of loaves and fishes – was made possible by securitising 
pools of loans, slicing them into tranches representing different claims on 
the stream of return from the pool, the now-infamous CDOs, and then 
pooling again the tranches into structured products of structured products, 
or CDOs ‘squared’, and so on. The so-called ‘toxic assets’ were the ‘equity’ 
tranches, typically representing about 5% of the total CDOs, that would be 
paid after all other claims on the stream of returns had been satisfied; by 
purchasing these riskiest tranches, normally reserved for hedge funds, an 
investor would in effect take up all the residual risk of the CDOs and thus 
leverage his or her investment 20 times (‘embedded’ leverage). 
 The magic of pooling and tranching was that, in the process, the risk 
distribution became more benign, while the underlying loans were riskier 
and riskier, thus providing sought-after higher returns. In the absence of 
liquid markets for these instruments, which were custom-made to suit the 
different appetite for risk of specialised investors and were traded over the 
counter, the miracle was made possible by evaluation models developed by 
issuers and validated by rating agencies – which were paid for these ratings 
by the issuers. Thus it was that, while there were only 12 companies with a 
Triple-A rating on the New York stock exchanges, by 2007 there were 
64,000 structured products with the top rating.9 
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Subsequent analysis has clarified that the asset price variability 
implicit in those models was a fraction of the observed distribution and 
that it took no account of the effects of risk correlation and diversification 
on default probabilities (Cooper, 2008, The Economist, 2009 and 
International Monetary Fund, 2008a). Similarly, no allowance was made for 
liquidity risks: but after markets turned down from their peaks, liquidity 
for these products vanished and they became unsalable, as their markets 
collapsed in a matter of weeks. It should be stressed that the growing 
divergence of ratings from reality did not go unnoticed by market 
participants: International Monetary Fund (2008a, p. 62) reports that since 
August 2007 credit spreads on Triple-A rated residential mortgage-backed 
securities in the United States were priced by the market like Triple-B rated 
corporate bonds. 
In sum, innovation played an important role in increasing the 
availability of credit and supporting the longest expansion in the world 
economy since World War II. Over time, however, finance turned inwards 
and started to pile up a paper pyramid that had little reference to 
underlying economic activities and apparently served the sole purpose of 
feeding speculation and enriching speculators. The huge costs eventually 
borne by societies now cast a long shadow over the future of financial 
systems that are likely to be severely constrained in their ability to provide 
credit and innovate. 
A last question that must be addressed concerns the role of regulation 
in making all this happen: one wonders whether, even in the presence of 
over-lax monetary conditions, some of the excesses that have been 
described could have been avoided – or will be avoidable – by means of 
appropriate regulatory responses. 
The short answer is that indeed lax regulation was a major 
permissive factor in letting lax macro-policies and abundant liquidity lead 
to unsustainable leverage and risk exposure by the financial system. The 
name of the game was regulatory competition – in a veritable race to the 
bottom – to let national financial centres and intermediaries gain the upper 
hand in the fierce battle for the most remunerative of businesses, i.e. 
finance. Calomiris (2000) is very explicit about it: “the [competitive] 
pressures of the 1980s [and 1990s] that prompted efficient deregulation (our 
italics) … mandated efficiency enhancing changes that would permit banks 
to survive” (see Introduction, p. xiv). Indeed, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act , 
which repealed Glass-Steagall and opened the field to a further wave of 
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deregulation beginning in the 1980s, notably with the elimination by the 
Federal Reserve of restrictions on bank underwriting activities, and in the 
early 1990s, with the federal interstate branching law that removed 
branching and consolidation limits.  
Also, the Federal Reserve systematically and successfully opposed all 
attempts to regulate the exploding derivatives market. Its strongly held 
view was that once retail depositors and investors are protected, all other 
agents and intermediaries can take care of themselves and do not need 
special prudential rules or oversight. Thus it was that between the early 
1990s and the early 2000s, a basically unregulated ‘shadow’ banking system 
took up a major proportion of credit intermediation – according to Morris 
(2008), representing some 80% of the total in New York capital markets – 
providing liquidity instruments and undertaking massive liquidity 
transformation with little capital buffers and transparency about its 
operations. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for its parts, closed 
both eyes on unsound market practices and market manipulations – as the 
wave of financial scams now coming to light makes all too clear – while 
quite a few of its top officials continued to land high-paying jobs on Wall 
Street. 
Aggressive de jure and de facto deregulation was not without 
consequences outside the United States, leading in Asia to waves of 
deregulation that promptly destabilised Asian capital markets, as has been 
described (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). The European Union had already 
removed all separation between commercial and investment banking at the 
beginning of the 1990s, following its Second Banking Directive.10 But there 
was another important channel whereby European continental banks 
somehow acquired US liberal rules on investment banking: they purchased 
US and UK investment banks and brokerage houses operating under those 
rules. Table 2 summarises the main such takeover operations: as may be 
seen by the end of the decade, the major continental European banks had 
gained a significant presence in US markets.  
These purchases also explain the large increase in the size of balance 
sheets and in leverage: for instance, Deutsche Bank was rapidly turned 
from a sleepy domestic universal bank into something like a hedge fund, 
with €1,600 billion of investment and brokerage activities built upon a slim 
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base of €400 billion of deposits and about €40 billion of regulatory capital. 
As was already mentioned, European supervisors didn’t blink, in order to 
let their banks participate in the great game of Wall Street finance. 
Table 2. Purchases of investment banking businesses by European banks, 
1989-2001 
Acquirer*   Year  Target   Target Nation 
1995  Brinson Partners Inc  US 
1995 S.G.  Warburg    UK 
1997 Dillon  Read    US 
1999  Global Asset Management   Bermuda 
UBS 
2000  PaineWebber Group Inc  US 
1989 Morgan  Grenfell  UK 
1997 Alex  Brown  Inc  US 
Deutsche Bank 
1999  Bankers Trust New York Corp**  US 
1990  CS First Boston Group Inc  US  Credit Suisse 
2000 Donaldson  Lufkin & Jenrette  US 
1995 Kleinwort  Benson Group PLC  UK  Dresdner 
2001 Wasserstein  Perella Group Inc  US 
*Or predecessor bank. Alex Brown was acquired by Bankers Trust before the latter was 
acquired by Deutsche Bank. 
** State commercial bank with significant investment banking activities.  
Data source: Thomson Financial SDC 2007. 
 
Also, the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) framework on 
regulatory capital helped a great deal by providing a standard for 
widespread risk-mitigation practices. It is sufficient to recall that under 
Basle I capital requirements, interbank exposures and credits insured with 
CDS have a very low weight. The problem is aggravated under Basle II 
capital standards – which entered into force on 1 January 2008, and 
therefore did not play a major role in the financial crisis – which entrust to 
the banks’ internal models a detailed evaluation of risks and attendant 
capital requirements: it’s like putting foxes to guard the chicken cage. 
Indeed, preliminary evidence indicates that under these new standards 
capital ratios have declined even further relative to those under Basle I, 
which had already proven wholly insufficient. 
Supervisory standards were also inadequate. Suffice it to say that 
they grossly overlooked colossal flaws in risk management practices of 
major banks, which assumed massive amounts of risks that even they 
barely understood – as epitomised by the Swiss banking giant UBS, whose KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 25 
 
CDO trading desk invested and lost billions without much internal 
oversight. Internal loss of control over enormously complex structures is 
indeed a common feature of all the major banking institutions experiencing 
gigantic losses (The Economist, 2009), raising big questions about the 
viability of the banking mammoths that have come to characterise the 
landscape of world finance. In addition, supervisors systematically 
overlooked massive conflicts of interest plaguing these large banking 
groups, notably in investment banking, where management interests in 
reaping the fees from gigantic leveraged operations and issuance of 
mountains of dubious paper overwhelmed all motivation of customer care.  
3.  Crisis management 
The decision to let Lehman Brothers go bust on 15 September 2008 marked 
the shift from a Wall Street crisis to a global banking panic. Financial 
institutions tried to make up for mounting losses by raising capital from the 
market, but as the liquidity crisis deepened and the supply of private 
equity froze, governments stepped in to fill the gap. Despite enormous 
capital injections by governments, financial markets have not yet hit 
bottom, due to swiftly aggravating economic conditions. By the end of 
February 2009, the US government had injected $250 billion into its 
troubled financial institutions, including the two largest banks and a major 
insurance company; in Europe, financial support was of the same 
magnitude, with the largest disbursements in Germany (up to €133 billion), 
the Netherlands (up to €49 billion) and the United Kingdom (£37 billion). 11 
Both in the United States and the United Kingdom, the state now 
owns majority stakes in its main financial institutions, and has also 
provided extensive guarantees against potential losses on troubled assets, 
without however replacing management or asking for the needed 
restructuring of failed institutions. Thus taxpayers have been footing 
ballooning costs without yet seeing the end of the tunnel.  
In general, governments worldwide have oscillated in their approach 
between capital injections and attempts to halt asset price falls with 
guarantees on potential losses or asset purchases,12 while in most cases still 
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balking at outright nationalisation – with the notable exception of the 
Dutch government, which last fall took over the Dutch operations of Fortis 
in banking and insurance without hesitation. They have seemed unaware 
of the fact that “handouts without proper workouts” were the real cause of 
Japan’s ‘lost decade’ in the 1990s.13 
Meanwhile, central banks have been the first line of defence under 
fire: they have lent massively to crumbling financial institutions and have 
deployed all their weapons in order to restore liquidity in the interbank 
and securities markets. In this endeavour, the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England, and to an extent also the Bank of Japan, have extended their 
credit lines to virtually all segments of intermediation and have started 
outright purchases of corporate securities. In the process, they have lost 
their independence and their soul, and have been turned into government 
agencies. The European Central Bank, which operates under tight Treaty 
constraints, has avoided so far a similar fate, but its ability to intervene has 
been curtailed by the lack of an EU Treasury able to back with its ultimate 
guarantee the outstanding stock of monetary liabilities denominated in 
euro.  
The public discussion has been plagued by confusion and 
incompetence, with political leaders too often seeking the limelight with 
simplistic formulas rather than trying to develop serious analysis and 
taking into consideration joint initiatives. Whereas the central requirement 
clearly is to build institutions and procedures to underpin cooperative 
responses, they have deluded themselves that one or another half-baked 
bright idea bandied about as a banner of national initiative could offer a 
way out, exposing dramatic inadequacies of collective action. 
3.1  Central banks on the firing line 
In the early stages of the financial crisis, two events revealed what was to 
come: the bank run on Northern Rock in September 2007, the first bank run 
in the United Kingdom since 1866 (Overend, Gurney and Company),14 and 
the bailout of Bear Stearns by the Federal Reserve in March 2008 – which 
was the first case of central bank support to a non-depository financial 
                                                      
13 “A ghoulish prospect”, The Economist, 28 February 2009. 
14 Llewellyn (2008) notes that Northern Rock was not legally insolvent but it was 
economically insolvent, since it was borrowing from the Bank of England at the 
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institution since the 1930s.15 Northern Rock and Bear Stearns were initially 
deemed to suffer from a liquidity crisis while remaining solvent.16 
However, on the basis of total, rather than risk-weighted, exposure, 
Northern Rock and Bear Stearns were grossly undercapitalised, both 
showing leverage ratios around 34. As noted by Morris (2008), it was a 
tulip-mania style story of insolvency, not of illiquidity.  
Central banks reacted swiftly and energetically to the unfolding 
financial crisis. Intervention rates were reduced in rapid steps to a target 
range of 0-0.25% level in the United States (December 2008), 0.5% in the 
United Kingdom (March 2009), also the lowest level ever reached in the 
Bank of England’s 315 years history, 1.5% in the euro area (March 2009), the 
lowest level in the ECB’s history. The main central banks also arranged 
large swap lines with other central banks and acted in concert to make 
refinancing in their currencies plentiful on all main markets. 
When normal refinancing instruments proved insufficient, they 
quickly expanded the list of eligible collateral and eligible institutions for 
refinancing operations (see Table 3 for a chronology and description of the 
multitude of liquidity operations undertaken by the Federal Reserve, Bank 
of England and European Central Bank from 2007 to the present). 
                                                      
15 The legal basis for the Bear Stearns bailout, as well as AIG, was section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act regulating discounts for individuals, partnerships and 
corporations “in unusual and exigent circumstances”. This provision was added to 
the Federal Reserve Act in 1932, but had never been used since the 1930s. 
16 Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, stated publicly that reputational issues 
and loss of liquidity were at the root of the crisis: “The fate of Bear Stearns was the 
result of a lack of confidence, not a lack of capital. […] the firm had a capital 
cushion well above what is required to meet supervisory standards calculated 
using the Basle II standard. Specifically, eve n  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  i t s  s a l e  [ … ] ,  B e a r  
Stearns' capital, and its broker-dealers' capital, exceeded supervisory standards. 
Counterparty withdrawals and credit denials, resulting in a loss of liquidity – not 
inadequate capital – caused Bear's demise” (Cox, 2008). Similarly, in the Tripartite 
Statement released by HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority on 14 September 2007, the latter judged that “Northern Rock is 
solvent, exceeds its regulatory capital requirement and has a good quality loan 
book. The decision to provide a liquidity support facility to Northern Rock reflects 
the difficulties that it has had in accessing longer-term funding and the mortgage 
securitisation market, on which Northern Rock is particularly reliant.” 28 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
Table 3. The explosion of central bank liquidity operations, 2007-09 
Federal Reserve 
12/10/07  Term Auction Facility: available to all depository institutions in sound 
financial conditions and eligible to borrow under the primary credit 
discount window programme 
11/03/08  Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF): up to $200 bn of Treasury 
securities to primary dealers guaranteed by other securities including 
residential mortgage-backed securities 
16/03/08 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF): secured loans to primary 
dealers, making a discount window available to non-depository 
institutions for the first time since the 1930s  
14/09/08  Extension of eligible collateral under PDCF and TSLF: increase in the 
frequency and size of TSLF 
19/09/08 Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Funds 
Liquidity Facility: loans to depository institutions and bank holding 
companies to finance purchases of commercial paper from money 
market mutual funds 
06/10/08 Payment of interest on required and excess reserve balances of 
depository institutions 
07/10/08 Commercial  Paper  Funding Facility: new liquidity b a c k s t o p  t o  U S  
issuers of commercial paper to purchase 3 mos unsecured and asset-
backed commercial paper 
21/10/08  Money Market Investor Funding Facility: senior secured funding to 
finance the purchase of money market instruments 
25/11/08  Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: up to $1 trillion loans to 
holders of Triple-A rated asset-backed securities (ABS) to support key 
securitisation markets. Purchase of up to $100 bn of direct obligations 
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks and up 
to $500 bn of mortgage-backed securities backed by Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae; amounts raised respectively to $200 bn 
and $1.25 trillion on 18 March 2009 
18/03/09  Purchase of up to $300 bn of long-term Treasury securities 
Bank of England 
21/04/08  Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) – up to £50 bn – for banks to swap 
mortgage-backed and other securities for UK Treasury bills; later 
raised to £200 bn 
03/10/08 Extension of eligible collateral in weekly sterling 3-mos repo 
operations to include Triple-A rated ABS and commercial paper 
08/10/08 Bank  debt  guaranteed by the UK government eligible as collateral in: 
a) sterling long-term repo open market operations; b) US dollar repo 
operations; c) the SLS 
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16/10/08  Operational Standing Facilities: banks allowed to borrow overnight 
from and deposit with the BoE in unlimited amounts at 25 bps above 
and below BoE rate 
Discount Window Facility (DWF): commercial banks allowed to swap 
eligible collateral for UK government securities; price increasing with 
the scale of access and riskiness of collateral posted; 30-day term 
maturity 
19/01/09  Asset Purchase Facility (APS): (authorised by Treasury) initially up to 
£50 bn purchase by BoE of corporate bonds, commercial paper and 
paper issued under the UK credit guarantee scheme 
DWF maturity increase from 30 days to 1 year for an incremental fee of 
25 bps 
05/03/09 APS  capacity increased to £75 bn and to be used for monetary policy 
purposes through purchase of gilts by BoE 
European Central Bank 
03/10/08  Expansion of eligible institutions that can participate in Euro-system 
open market operations 
15/10/08  Expansion of the list of assets eligible as collateral in Euro-system 
credit operations. Lower threshold for marketable and non-marketable 
assets, with the exception of ABS. Enhancement of the provision of 
longer-term refinancing and US dollar liquidity through EUR/USD 
foreign exchange swaps.  
Sources: Federal Reserve, Bank of England and European Central Bank. 
In its attempt to restore the clogged circulation of liquidity, the 
Federal Reserve created three sets of new tools17 for: 
i)  providing short-term liquidity to sound non-bank financial 
institutions, e.g. the Term Securities Lending Facility and the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility;  
ii)  supporting loans to consumers and small businesses, with direct 
purchases of commercial paper and other money market instruments 
as well as asset-backed securitised products; and 
iii)  purchasing debt of housing-related government-sponsored 
enterprises, mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, and long-term Treasury securities. 
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As a result, between August 2008 and February 2009, the size of its 
balance sheet more than doubled, from $869 billion to nearly $2 trillion. 
More important, all distinctions between liquidity support and rescue 
operations for insolvent institutions vanished and the Federal Reserve not 
only was asked to intervene directly in large bailouts ($100 billion for Bear 
Stearns and AIG alone), but has de facto become the residual contributor of 
capital to insolvent institutions, as is manifest in the latest assets guarantee 
schemes for Citigroup and Bank of America. In both these cases, the 
Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are 
committed to cover losses up to defined amounts while the Federal Reserve 
will cover losses exceeding that limit, by printing money with the ultimate 
backing of the US taxpayer. In sum, the Federal Reserve has forfeited its 
independence and become a government agency. 
The Bank of England was similarly aggressive in its liquidity 
measures. In April 2008, it created a Special Liquidity Scheme to allow 
banks to swap high-quality mortgage-backed and other securities against 
UK Treasury bills; it also launched the Operational Standing Facilities and 
the Discount Window Facility designed to help access of banks to central 
bank liquidity. In January 2009, it opened a new asset purchase facility 
under which it may purchase a range of high-quality corporate bonds, 
commercial paper and paper issued under the UK credit guarantee scheme. 
In March 2009, it moved to a quantitative easing strategy entailing direct 
purchases of Treasury bills. 
The major changes introduced in operating procedures by the 
European Central Bank, outlined in Table 3, were less radical, for two 
reasons. First, its rules were already more flexible than those of its sister 
central banks and in October 2008 its list of eligible collateral and 
institutions that can participate in euro-system open market operations was 
further broadened. Second, and more important, the ECB statute of 
independence and operational goals are set by the EC Treaty, which can 
only be modified by a unanimous decision by the member states. 
Bank rescue operations, or a possible bailout of one of the member 
states, fall within the exclusive competence of the member states; in any 
event the European Central Bank could not count on the support of a 
Union Treasury for such hypothetical operations, since such a body does 
not exist. The absence of such a body raises the question of how to proceed, 
and with what resources, in case of failure of a major cross-border bank or KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 31 
 
a member state default on its sovereign debt (Bini Smaghi, 2008).18 To this 
issue we will revert in section 6, where we argue that a substantial 
European Financial Stabilisation Fund should be set up for all the purposes 
indicated above and that it should be empowered to tap capital markets 
through the issuance of Union bonds. 
3.2  Enter the state 
As the crisis deepened, governments stepped in with their budgets. On 3 
October 2008, the US Congress approved the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA), centred on a programme of troubled asset 
purchases – the Troubled Assets Relief Program or TARP – up to $700 
billion. Price discovery was entrusted to an ingenious system of ‘reverse’ 
auctions whereby banks would compete to sell their assets to the Treasury 
by lowering their offer price. The plan was never implemented, not least 
because the technical hurdles created by the extreme heterogeneity of the 
assets involved. 
Two weeks later, the Treasury changed tack and started deploying 
TARP resources for recapitalising financial institutions, following the 
model just chosen by the United Kingdom and the European Union in early 
October: the Treasury launched the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), based 
on capital injections in the form of senior preferred shares and warrants. 
On 13 October the chief executives of nine large financial institutions were 
summoned to a meeting with Treasury secretary Paulson where they were 
basically told how much capital each would have to take, and they 
obliged.19 As of 20 February 2009, the total amount of capital made 
                                                      
18 Bini Smaghi explains that ‘the European monetary framework makes a clear 
distinction between the respective competences of the ECB, the national central 
banks, the supervisory authorities, and the governments which are ultimately 
responsible for the use of taxpayers' money. This framework protects against the 
use of the inflation tax, which is largely paid by the poorest, to save banks in 
difficult situation by socializing the losses. This is a strength of the current system.’ 
(pp. 141-142, our translation). 
19 The first banks to benefit from the CPP were: Bank of America Corporation ($15 
billion), Bank of New York Mellon Corporation ($3 billion), Citigroup Inc. ($25 
billion), Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ($10 billion), JPMorgan Chase & Co. ($25 
billion), Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc ($10 billion), Morgan Stanley ($10 billion), State 
Street Corporation ($2 billion) and Wells Fargo & Company ($25 billion). 32 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
available under the CPP has reached $196 billion, benefiting some 441 
institutions.20 The Treasury also established two additional facilities, the 
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (SSFIs) and the Targeted 
Investment (TIP) Programmes (Table 4), both entailing high discretion in 
the identification of beneficiary institutions and the choice of the terms of 
support.21  
In early 2009, the Treasury revived plans for the purchase of troubled 
assets of financial institutions, to be implemented side by side with capital 
injections. A new fund will be established, with an endowment between 
$500 billion and $1 trillion raised from the public budget as well as private 
investors, so as to liberate financial institutions of their troubled assets. The 
involvement of the private sector is apparently meant not only to minimise 
the use of public capital, but especially to ensure a sound basis for the 
valuation of troubled assets. The precise role of public investors is not yet 
clear. 
Capital injections will come from the newly created Capital 
Assistance Program (CAP): banks will have to initially undergo a ‘stress 
test’, which will be used to assess their continuing viability; the stress test is 
mandatory for the 19 banks with total assets exceeding $100 billion, 
whether or not they apply to the CAP.22 A weakness in this scheme may be 
associated with the stress test itself, to the extent that rumours and leaks on 
its outcome could unsettle the markets and precipitate events while the 
bank is still considering the best line of action.  
 
                                                      
20 With regard to dividend policy, the general TARP provisions indicated a 5% 
yearly dividend on preferred shares, with a step-up clause after the first 5 years, up 
to 9%. A step-up clause has been set up as an incentive instrument for recapitalised 
institutions to raise private capital and reimburse public funds as soon as feasible. 
21 $40 billion in preferred shares have been already allocated to AIG under the 
SSFIs Program, and $20 billion to Bank of America and Citigroup under TIP. 
22 CAP recapitalisations would take place through ‘contingent equity’, that is 
preferred shares convertible into common equity in case of need, to restore 
investors’ confidence or meet supervisory capital requirements. Banks were 
allowed to exchange their existing TARP preferred stock with the new preferred 
shares and the management of the government’s investments was assigned to a 
Financial Stability Trust. These 19 banks are also allowed to delay public funding 
for six months to raise as much private capital as possible (incentive for private 
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Table 4. Government measures in support of financial institutions 
Country Capital  injection  State  guarantee on banks assets and 
liabilitiesa  
UK  At least £50 bn in preferred and 
ordinary shares available to 8 
major institutions 
Capital injections to be managed 
by a new company, wholly owned 
by the government (UK Financial 
Investments Limited) 
Various accessory conditionsb 
Deposit insurance: raised to £50,000 
Up to £250 bn on certificates of deposit, 
commercial paper and senior 
unsecured bonds and notes 
Guarantee schemes on triple-A asset-
backed securities (ABS) and on asset 
classes “most affected by current 
economic conditions” (e.g. commercial 
and residential property loans, struc-
tured credit assets, leveraged loans) 
France  Up to €40 bn in hybrid capital 
instruments (non-core Tier 1 
capital, non-voting, non-dilutive) 
Capital to be managed by a state 
agency, the Société de Prise de 
Participation de l’Etat (SPPE) 
€10.5 bn capital injection into 6 
private banks 
Various accessory conditionsb 
Deposit insurance: €70,000 to be raised 
if necessary 
New refinancing institution (SRAEC) 
will issue state-guaranteed securities to 
make loans to credit institutions 
against collateral, at above-market 
rates (up to €320 bn, including the 
guarantee on Dexia) 
Germany  New financial market stabilization 
fund (SoFFin) 
€80 bn in equity or hybrid 
instruments (Tier 1 capital); 
preferential dividends or interest 
rights 
Various accessory conditionsb  
Deposit insurance: unlimited (political 
declaration) 
Up to €400 bn on new debt issues with 
maturity up to 36 months (through 
SoFFin)  
 
Italy  Subscription or guarantee on new 
issues of non-voting privileged 
shares and hybrid financial 
instruments computable as core 
Tier 1 capital 
Case-by-case intervention, with 
need of recapitalisation verified 
by the Bank of Italy 
Various accessory conditionsb 
Deposit insurance: integration of the 
existing guarantee (€103,291) 
On new bank liabilities with maturity 
up to 5 years; on loans granted by the 
Bank of Italy for emergency liquidity 
assistance to banks; on banks’ 
transactions to obtain securities eligible 
as collateral for refinancing 
Spain     Deposit insurance: raised to €100,000 
Up to €100 bn on new debt issued 
through commercial paper and senior 
bonds with maturity up to 5 years. The 
guarantee might be extended to 
interbank deposits 34 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
Country Capital  injection  State  guarantee on banks assets and 
liabilitiesa  
Sweden  Up to €1.5 bn to a new 
stabilisation fund for capital 
injection into banks in exchange 
for voting preferred shares 
Various accessory conditionsb 
Deposit insurance: raised to kronor 
500,000 (€50,000) 
Up to €150 bn on new issues of short- 
and medium-term non-subordinated 
debt, with maturity up to 3 years, 
exceptionally 5 years for covered 
bonds. Available only to institutions 
with at least 6% Tier 1 capital and at 
least 9% combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital 
Ireland  €5.5 bn capital injection into the 
three largest banks in core Tier 1, 
voting, non-convertible preference 
shares 
Various accessory conditionsb 
Deposit insurance: unlimited 
On retail and corporate deposits, inter-
bank deposits, senior unsecured debt, 
asset covered securities and dated 
subordinated debt; initially seven 
domestic banks involved, subsequently 
guarantee extended to six foreign 
banks’ subsidiaries 
US  Capital Purchase Program: up to 
$250 bn in non-voting senior 
preferred shares and warrants; 
$196 bn allocated to 441 financial 
institutions (as of 20 February 
2009) 
Systemically Significant Failing 
Institutions Program and 
Targeted Investment Program: 
any financial instrument, 
including debt, equity, or 
warrants, that the Secretary of the 
Treasury determines to be a 
troubled asset 
Capital Assistance Program: 
preferred shares convertible into 
common equity; Stress test, 
mandatory for the 19 banks with 
total assets exceeding $100 bn. 
Various accessory conditionsb 
Deposit insurance: raised to $250,000 
On all senior unsecured debt and non-
interest bearing deposit transaction 
accounts 
 
a Cost of debt guarantees schemes often based on CDS spread. See Table 5 for ECB 
guidelines. 
b Typically including limits on executive pay and dividend distribution, and commitments 
to maintain or expand lending to private sector. 
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Overall, the second wave of US schemes in support of the banking 
sector has seen the Treasury taking up increasing stakes in troubled 
institutions, as well as unlimited responsibility for potential losses, while 
continuing to rule out outright nationalisation. It remains to be seen how 
long the US taxpayer will accept to make good the bankers’ losses without 
full control of the failing banks and adequate restructuring plans.  
The legitimacy of the case-by-case approach to rescue operations was 
weakened by financial institutions and their creditors being treated 
differently without clear reasons. For example, Bear Stearns’ creditors and 
banks bearing the CDSs of AIG were repaid in full, while Washington 
Mutual’s shareholders and creditors saw their claims wiped out. 
In Europe the wave of bank recapitalisations began on 8 October 
2008, when the UK government announced a £50 billion plan to inject 
capital into banks and building societies, together with measures to 
strengthen bank liquidity and guarantee their medium-term funding. Eight 
UK institutions were indicated as eligible for capital injections, but only 
three of them (RBS, HBOS and Lloyds TSB) accepted the public funds. One 
main problem of selective bailouts without straight nationalisation that 
clearly emerged at that time is the stigma associated with state aid, since 
financial markets take it as a sign of weakness and therefore cover their 
bets by selling their stakes.  
The UK model was followed in a matter of days by the euro area, 
even though the precise choice of instruments varied (see again Table 4). 
On 12 October the first-ever gathering of the Heads of State and 
Government of the euro area agreed a concerted action plan comprising 
strengthened deposit insurance, government guarantees on new security 
issues by banks and capital injections; the plan was subsequently endorsed 
by the European Council meeting on 15-16 October. 
In France six financial banking groups were indicated as eligible to 
issue to the government subordinated debt computable as regulatory 
capital for €10.5 billion. The German government allotted €80 billion for 
capital injections and €20 billion for asset purchases. In Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom, the management of public investments for 
recapitalisations was entrusted to new public agencies, in order to limit 
political interferences in the management of financial institutions. The 
Italian government made support available to listed Italian banking groups 
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Spain, on the other hand, focused on assets purchases, creating a 
specialised fund charged with the task.  
National guarantee schemes cover a wide range of non-deposit 
liabilities, e.g. senior bonds, subordinated debt and commercial paper, with 
significant cross-country variations (Table 4).23  
However, the combination of national liquidity and guarantee 
schemes has failed to address satisfactorily the question of who takes 
responsibility for foreign subsidiaries of financial institutions of systemic 
relevance. The Irish government even tried initially to limit its support to 
Irish-owned banking institutions, but was soon forced to extend it to all 
subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in its territory. As a result, there has 
been an air of uncertainty as to what would happen to depositors and 
creditors in case of insolvency, further depressing the battered currencies of 
EU member states that do not participate in the euro and neighbouring 
countries whose banking systems are largely controlled by Western 
European banks. 
3.3  Toxic assets, bad banks and nationalisation 
As has been seen, the question of how best to restore financial viability to 
troubled banks and confidence is far from resolved. Initially, notably in the 
United States, asset purchases were seen as a substitute for capital 
injections, in a socio-political environment strongly opposed to state 
intervention in private capital. However, the beneficial effects on capital 
and leverage of asset purchases are indirect and proportionately smaller 
than direct capital injections, entailing much higher costs for the 
government. At the same time, capital injections are an insufficient cure to 
the extent that asset price falls destroy capital more rapidly than it can be 
shored up: therefore, asset purchases are considered as a tool to halt asset 
price falls and interrupt the vicious circle of losses engendering further 
asset sales engendering further losses.  
                                                      
23 The European Commission published in October 2008 its recommendations on 
the pricing of government debt guarantee, while the European Central Bank made 
public its recommendations in December 2008; see European Commission (2008a), 
European Central Bank (2008a). The pricing method recommended by the 
European Central Bank is based on CDS spread for debt with maturity exceeding 
one year, (CDS spread plus add-on fee of 0.5%), while a flat fee of 0.5% applies to 
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No matter what goal one wishes to pursue, asset purchases pose the 
fundamental dilemma that if the price paid for toxic assets is high enough 
to stabilise banks’ balance sheets, then the taxpayer is likely to foot much of 
the losses for bankers’ mistakes; but if taxpayers’ interests are preserved, 
then the price paid to banks will reveal that they are bankrupt. For this 
reason, the appeals periodically issued by various authorities to the banks 
to fully expose their losses sound hollow: they miss the fundamental point 
that banks don’t know their losses, in a context of continuously falling asset 
prices and economic activity and, worse, if they were able to quantify them, 
their disclosure could entail immediate bankruptcy. 
As for ‘bad banks’, they are only one tool to remove troubled assets 
from banks’ balance sheets, a tool that cannot eliminate the need for a 
fundamental decision on who should pay for the losses. In this regard, the 
public debate sometimes seems less than fully aware of the full 
implications of historical experience, notably when the successful Swedish 
experiment in the early 1990s is compared with the failure to act in Japan, 
to argue that setting up a bad bank for all toxic assets in the banking system 
would be a panacea. 
In reality, the Swedish model entailed the creation of separate asset 
management companies – heftily capitalised and charged with the orderly 
workout of troubled assets – only for each of the two largest banks, 
Nordbanken and Gota. More importantly, troubled assets were transferred 
to these companies only after the state had seized ownership of both banks, 
so that the question of asset evaluation was treated as an internal affair in a 
receivership procedure, with bankers and their shareholders fully removed 
from the picture. The two companies were provided with highly 
professional management and were granted full independence from 
political interference and favourable legal rules, showing the real benefit in 
combining public ownership with efficient management (Calomiris, 2000, 
Ergungor, 2007 and Calomiris et al., 2005).24 As for Japan’s ‘lost decade’, 
subsequent analysis has made it clear that the real mistake was to continue 
to prop up the banks, without introducing proper changes in management 
or restructuring.  
                                                      
24 The process took a few years and liquidations were concluded by 1997. Securum, 
the management company created for Nordbanken, lost about 40% of its capital 
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All in all, the discussion on toxic assets and bad banks should be seen 
for what it really is: a standoff between governments who are loathe to foot 
the bill for bankers’ mistakes, and bankers who are trying to offload onto 
taxpayers their potential losses in order to survive. This impasse is why the 
question of nationalisation cannot be escaped and must be confronted 
outright.25  
Indeed, by March 2009, governments had a dominant equity interest 
in Fortis, Citigroup, AIG, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, but only in a 
limited number of cases, e.g. Northern Rock, the Anglo-Irish Bank and the 
Dutch assets of Fortis, was there a straight nationalisation. Otherwise, 
public money was used to keep bankers afloat with their banks. It is easy to 
see that the critical difference is whether or not the injection of public 
capital is followed by radical restructuring, or whether the old boys are 
allowed to keep on managing the bank in effective continuity with the past. 
Of course, nationalisations present problems of their own, notably 
including the choice of new management, avoidance of improper political 
interference and the timing and procedures for returning the bank to 
private hands. But in all likelihood the cost to governments would in all 
cases be lower than under the alternative of continuing to prop up failed 
institutions and their management.26 
In fact, to all practical purposes, nationalisation should be seen as the 
effective substitute for bankruptcy procedures, which in the case of banks 
cannot be used due to the likely disruptive effects on public confidence. 
The period of public ownership could also be used to break up financial 
firms that have grown too large not only to fail, but also to be effectively 
managed. It may be noted in this context that the government-assisted 
private purchases of Merrill Lynch and Wachovia,27 respectively by Bank of 
America and Wells Fargo, have damaged the acquiring institutions and 
created even bigger and more complex banking behemoths.  
                                                      
25 In February 2009, the European Commission published its guidelines on the 
treatment of impaired assets, supporting the adoption of a common European 
approach, but leaving to member states discretion for the choice of instruments to 
adopt (e.g. bad bank, guarantee on toxic assets). 
26 See Elliott (2009) for a review of the pros and cons of nationalisation. 
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3.4  Strengthened tools for crisis management 
A number of flaws in the approach to crisis management so far are readily 
apparent and can be corrected. First, as inevitable as it may have been, 
despite grand announcements of coherent and coordinated strategies, de 
facto public authorities in the United States and the main European 
countries, which still are in the eye of the storm, are responding to the 
events as they unfold, case-by-case, and in each case differently. This has 
created not only arbitrary differences of treatment but damaging 
uncertainty as to the real direction of policy, further unsettling markets and 
investors. Most damaging of all has been the discussion in the United States 
about toxic asset disposal, bad banks and nationalisation: to the extent that 
a bank can no longer stand up by itself, it is much better for the state to take 
it over, restructure and resell to private investors, than to go on quibbling 
about the right price of impaired assets. 
On the other hand, there are quite a few financial institutions out 
there that have manageable losses but need to bring their capital to a much 
higher level, so as to reassure depositors and investors; they cannot raise it 
under the present taxing conditions in capital markets and should be 
helped generously and across the board by governments, based on clear 
and uniform criteria. Support could appropriately be subject to an 
assessment by supervisory authorities on their viability – barring all 
political interference in the process, since politicians are all too willing to 
interfere to help their friends and hit at their enemies. On this score, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank have managed 
eventually to develop clear guidelines, after some initial confusion (Table 
5). They were held up by reference to traditional doctrines of lending of last 
resort, based on the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency 
(Bagehot, 1873 and Rochet, 2008), where the former should be helped and 
the latter let go bust. The problem is that a general liquidity crisis can 
throw banks into insolvency that are perfectly viable under orderly market 
conditions; the real distinction is that between banks that should 
immediately nationalised since they cannot continue to operate under any 
circumstances, and those that can continue, albeit with a substantial capital 
injection. 
A related question concerns the remuneration of public support, 
which has been controversial especially in Europe, due to the need on the 
one hand to respect common state aid rules in unprecedented 
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particular relative to their US competitors. In their guidelines, the 
Commission and the European Central Bank have indicated a ‘corridor’ for 
remuneration that depends on the financial instrument (Table 5), whose 
choice was left to the discretion of national governments and may include 
any instrument computable as regulatory capital, from subordinated debt 
to ordinary shares.28 The result has been a wide variety of solutions, far 
from the level playing field that one would have hoped for. To the extent 
that public injections of capital by EU governments are likely to mount, 
some greater uniformity will no doubt be necessary, both in the 
instruments and the remuneration, with national discretion strictly limited 
to what is necessary to respect different institutional and legal settings.  
Finally, as has been seen, the European Central Bank is bound by 
very strict limits in its ability to support liquidity compared with the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, which have already moved into 
the unchartered waters of quantitative easing – that is the direct purchase 
of financial instruments issued by end-users of funds, such as commercial 
paper or portfolios of securitised loans. To leave things as they are seems 
utterly unsafe, in view of the possible aggravation of the credit crunch that 
seems already under way also in Europe.  
The key issue in this regard is that the ECB’s powers to act are strictly 
limited by the EC Treaty and, furthermore, unlike the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of England, the European Central Bank is not backed by a fiscal 
authority.29 A way to tackle this weakness without endangering the ECB’s 
independence might be the establishment of a European Fund that would 
issue Eurobonds and make the proceeds available to the European Central 
Bank for its operations, as proposed by Gros & Micossi (2008). We will 
revert to this issue later, also in connection with wider financial support 
operations that EU governments should be capable of managing jointly. 
                                                      
28 See European Central Bank (2008b) and European Commission (2008b). 
29 The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are remarkably different 
also in other respects, with the former managing monetary policy also in view of 
growth goals, and in addition banking supervision and lending of last resort, while 
the latter only is charged with monetary policy strictly geared to maintaining price 
stability. The Bank of England stands somehow in between the Federal Reserve 
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Table 5. European Commission and ECB guidelines on state aid to banks 
Recapitalisation  
  Cost   Terms and conditions 
COM   As close as possible to market 
rates. Minimum remuneration 
based on ECB methodology. 
Different for ‘fundamentally 
sound’ banks and weaker banks, 
with higher rates mandated for 
the latter. Remuneration to be 
differentiated on the basis of 
capital instrument used and risk 
profile, evaluated on capital 
adequacy, size of 
recapitalisation, current and pre-
crisis credit default swaps (CDS) 
spread, rating.  
Presumption of adequacy of the 
remuneration in case of 
significant participation (at least 
30%) of private investors on 
equal terms. 
Temporary and limited to minimum 
necessary. 
Behavioural restrictions: need to 
avoid competitive distortions; 
restrained dividend policies; 
evaluation report after 6 mos. 
Stricter requirements for banks not 
‘fundamentally sound’. 
Clawback/better fortune clause and 
incentives for early capital 
redemption (e.g. add-on to the entry 
price, step-up clauses), with case-by-
case evaluation of exit mechanisms. 
    
ECB  
 
Subordinated debt: government 
bonds yield + 5 yrs CDS spread 
on subordinated debt + 2% 
annual add-on fee (estimated 
average: 6%). 
Ordinary shares: government 
bonds yield + 5% annual equity 
risk premium + 1% annual add-
on fee (estimated average: 9.3%). 
Preferred shares and hybrid 
instruments: market return 
between ordinary shares (upper 
bound) and subordinated debt 
(lower bound); when similar to 
subordinated debt, 1% add-on 
fee. 
a)  Reference to market situation of 
each institution and level of 
subordination and risk of 
instruments chosen for 
recapitalisation; 
b) Maintaining credit flow to the 
economy, avoiding increase of 
pressures on financial system, 
negative impact on beneficiaries’ 
attractiveness to investors and 
stigma on beneficiary institutions; 
c)  Minimising potential loss for the 
government; 
d) Ensuring level-playing field;  
e)  Setting terms so as to ensure 
temporary nature of public 
intervention. 
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 Debt  guarantee 
  Cost   Terms and conditions 
COM 
 
As close as possible to market 
price, reflecting beneficiaries’ 
credit profile and risk profile. 
 
Amount and duration limited to 
minimum necessary.  
No discrimination or competitive 
distortions.  
Blanket coverage of all liabilities 
forbidden. Clawback/better fortune 
clause. 
Behavioural restrictions on 
commercial conduct, including 
prohibition of conduct irreconcilable 
with the purpose of the guarantee 
(e.g. share repurchase and issuance 
of new stock options for managers). 
Enforcement by member states, 
including removal of guarantee in 
case of non-compliance. 
     
ECB  Based on banks’ CDS spread: 
‐ maturity less than or equal to 1 
year: flat fee of 0.5%. 
‐ maturity exceeding 1 year: CDS 
spread + add-on fee of 0.5%. 
Lower add-on fee in member 
states where government 
guarantees may be 
collateralised. 
a)  Support to liquidity by improving 
the functioning of market for long 
term bank debt; 
b)  Preservation of level-playing field 
among financial institutions and 
avoidance of market distortions; 
c)  Liquidity support in individual 
cases to be compatible with 
aggregate liquidity management. 
     
 Impaired  assets 
  Cost   Terms and conditions 
COM  Valuation based on underlying 
risks. Adequate burden-sharing 
of the costs related to impaired 
assets between the shareholders, 
the creditors and the state. 
Adequate remuneration for the 
state, at least equivalent to the 
remuneration of state capital. 
No undue discrimination as to the 
sellers; temporary and limited to the 
strictly necessary, no undue 
distortions of competition. Full ex 
ante transparency and disclosure of 
impairments; six months enrolment 
window to prevent delay in 
disclosure. Clear functional and 
organisational separation between 
the beneficiary bank and its 
impaired assets, to restore viability 
and prevent conflicts of interest. 
Appropriate restructuring, following 
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ECB  Risk-sharing, to limit cost for 
governments, provide right 
incentives and maintain a level 
playing field.  
Risk-sharing mechanisms best 
decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Voluntary participation 
recommended: if compulsory, 
priority to institutions with large 
concentrations of impaired assets. 
Broad definition of assets eligible for 
support. 
Common valuation criteria across 
member states. 
Sufficiently long duration, possibly 
matching the maturity structure of 
eligible assets. 
Conditionality to measurable 
yardsticks (e.g. commitments to 
credit provision), but no mechanical 
application of conditions. 
Sources: European Commission (2008a and b, 2009a) and European Central Bank (2008a and 
b, 2009). 
4.  Regulatory architecture 
The nature of financial intermediation has evolved in recent years and a 
series of economic and legal developments has significantly changed the 
financial markets’ morphology (Allen & Santomero 1998). The barriers 
between banking, insurance and securities market activities have fallen 
together with geographic and legal restrictions, and the model of the 
universal bank has not only spread worldwide, but increasingly has 
evolved into complex financial conglomerates operating worldwide.   
A related development concerns the composition of banks’ balance 
sheets. As early as the 1980s, banks had started to manage jointly their asset 
and liability side, with their total scale of operation becoming independent 
of their retail deposit base. A main s o u r c e  o f  f u n d s ,  i n  t h i s  n e w  
environment, has come to be represented by interbank relations; banks 
have also become major providers of funds to the commercial paper market 
and to non-bank intermediaries, leading to the explosion of the wholesale 
money market and of mutual links between intermediaries. Indirectly, non-
bank intermediaries were given virtually unlimited access to the benefits of 
a large deposit base and attendant public guarantees on the banking 
system, since an increasing share of their funding was provided by the 
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As a result of becoming thus intimately intertwined with non-bank 
intermediaries, to which they provided ultimate liquidity backing, banks 
have become fully exposed to capital markets risk that they did not 
manage, did not understand and were unable to assess independently. 
Therefore, the nature of systemic risk – traditionally limited to the banking 
sector changed: it was no longer solely related to the possibility of deposit 
withdrawals with illiquid loans, but became dependent on the behaviour 
and stability of a host of non-bank intermediaries, including investment 
banks, insurance firms writing derivative contracts and hedge funds 
providing liquidity to banks’ borrowing in the capital market.  
A main factor precipitating the financial crisis was the leveraged 
exposure of financial organisations to large holdings of securities that were 
very hard to value and for which there were no liquid markets. Later on, 
the deteriorating economic landscape has added virulence to banks’ 
difficulties, due to their exposure to clients engulfed by the recession. 
Financial derivatives amplified the shocks between markets and 
intermediaries.   
Against this background, the debate has flared up once again on the 
desirability of going back to a legal separation between commercial and 
investment banking or, in other versions, between ’narrow’ banking and all 
other commercial and investment banking activities. Similarly, there have 
been proposals to segregate security market activity and entrust them to 
specialised intermediaries. 
In this vein, De Grauwe (2008) has proposed a return to a Glass-
Steagall-type system “in which banks are excluded from investing in 
equities, derivatives and complex structured products. Investment in such 
products can only be performed by financial institutions, investment banks, 
which are forbidden from funding these investments by deposits (either 
obtained from the public or from other commercial banks)”. 
Kay (2009) has suggested the adoption of an even narrower definition 
of banking, strictly circumscribed to supplying means of payments and 
investing in self-liquidating commercial loans and safe assets (‘banks as 
utilities’). “The primary objective of the regulation of financial services 
looking forward is that the casino should never again jeopardise the utility” 
(p. 223).  
How precisely these proposals would be implemented is not entirely 
clear. In its pure version, narrow banking consists of the obligation to 
invest all or most retail deposits in safe assets, thus removing all maturity 
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of course make regulation and safety nets unnecessary; depositors would 
only be exposed to the risk of fraud. Of course, all benefits from liquidity 
and maturity transformation would be lost; narrow banks would abandon 
their key function of analysing the quality of commercial loans, which 
would need to be performed by specialised intermediaries; they could 
exploit neither economies of scope nor the synergy effects offered by the 
joint production of lending and deposit-taking. Credit growth would in all 
likelihood be severely curtailed.  
In their recent report on financial reform, the G-30 (2009) have 
proposed, among other things, that large, systemically important banking 
institutions should be restricted in undertaking proprietary activities that 
present particularly high risk and serious conflict of interest, and that the 
management of hedge and private equity funds should be prohibited in 
cases where the banking institution’s own capital is commingled with client 
funds.30 In general, they have considered that government-insured deposit-
taking institutions should never be owned or controlled by unregulated 
non-financial organisations. Finally, in their view, limits on deposit 
concentration should be established at a level appropriate to individual 
countries – in a sort of generalisation of the ancient US prohibition of 
interstate banking (see their Core Recommendation 1). 
Our view is that these radical solutions are neither necessary nor 
feasible. They are not necessary because the stability of the system can be 
brought about by simple, although quite radical, changes to the key 
prudential rules that do not entail a redesign of financial markets. And not 
feasible, since the disruptions and dislocation required to implement such 
massive reorganisation of the financial system would be enormous, and in 
all likelihood would eventually prove unacceptable for legislators and 
regulators in the main financial centres. 
As we argue below, prudential regulation and supervision should 
remain centred on depository banks, while for other intermediaries, 
notably those of systemic relevance, the main requirement would be one of 
enhanced transparency, under close monitoring by supervisory authorities. 
While it is desirable that deposit banks concentrate their investments in 
lending to commercial customers, this result can be achieved without 
                                                      
30 See also J. Gapper, “The case for a Glass-Steagall ‘lite’”, Financial Times, 11 March 
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legally binding rules, by imposing penalties on other activities. Finally, the 
traditional tasks of micro-prudential regulation should be complemented 
by appropriate arrangements for macro-prudential supervision, capable of 
monitoring financial system stability as a whole and recognising at an early 
stage destabilising credit and asset price developments that may endanger 
systemic stability.  
4.1  Banks and non-banks in a sound regulatory system 
The special feature of banks that have traditionally justified regulation, 
deposit insurance and state backing is that deposits are the only financial 
product that can be withdrawn on demand at par value. Traditional 
theories of financial intermediation underlined the important role of banks 
in underpinning the payment system. Subsequent theories have stressed 
their role in reducing uncertainty and information asymmetries both on the 
asset and liability sides (Diamond, 1984 and Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). 
In order to make money, banks must lend at longer maturities to 
customers who may default on their loans. Since depositors’ money is on-
lent, banks do not have sufficient liquidity to pay back all depositors at the 
same time, which exposes them to the risk of a bank run when confidence 
on the solidity of their loans fades away (Cooper, 2008 and Rochet, 2008). 
Deposit insurance has thus come to life to avoid bank runs and panics.  
Regulation originally tried to protect the stability of banking by 
limiting their activities with geographical, functional and size restrictions,31 
or by favouring nationalisation. The drawback was that in this way the 
room for scale and scope economies and innovation was reduced and the 
system was fairly inefficient and costly.32 Over time, asymmetric 
information theories emphasised the need of risk-based capital 
requirements and deposit insurance schemes. 
The wave of deregulation that began in the 1980s was basically 
motivated by the need to make banks able to compete with non-bank 
intermediaries, which were eroding their commercial base by offering 
                                                      
31 In the US the McFadden Act restrictions on interstate banking (1927) started to 
fall in 1978 and were completely removed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
removed the functional restrictions imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. 
32 There is a wide academic literature on the potential economies of scale and scope 
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substitutes for their deposits and loans that were paying higher interest 
rates or costing less (Calomiris, 2000).  
Non-bank intermediaries were not equally regulated basically 
because they do not pose an equal threat to financial stability, since their 
liabilities do not possess the twin features of being redeemable on demand 
and at par. For example, money market and other investment funds can be 
withdrawn nearly on demand but the value is uncertain, depending on the 
value of the assets. Investors giving money to an investment fund receive a 
number of quotas or shares at the moment of investment and, when they 
disinvest, they can only claim the money that can be raised from selling 
their quotas in the fund, which have a price determined daily in the 
market.  
That is why, unlike commercial banks, non-bank intermediaries like 
investment or hedge funds, are not exposed to the risk of a customer run to 
the extent that their assets and liabilities are market priced. Basically, they 
do not even need capital from a strictly systemic-stability viewpoint. A 
capital requirement is needed solely for reputational reasons, to entice 
investors; since they have capital, they can also leverage it, thus increasing 
the riskiness of their operations.  
An intermediate case is represented by investment banks, that 
typically raise money by issuing securities, rather than deposits, in order to 
invest in other securities and undertake proprietary trading activities. Thus, 
in this simple form, they are not exposed to liquidity risks, only to market 
and counterparty risks. If the value of securities owned is insufficient to 
repay outstanding debt, leading to the failure of the intermediary, only 
bondholders and shareholders will be affected. To the extent that investors 
were aware of the risks they were taking, there is no issue of liquidity, 
lending of last resort and moral hazard.  
In bank-centred models, separate investment banking intermediaries 
may or may not exist, but in all cases they grant medium- and long-term 
loans, in principle raising money in capital markets through medium- and 
long-term security issues. Thus, even here there is no liquidity risk, 
although they typically have access to central bank lending. 
Finally, insurance firms provide ‘reverse’ maturity transformation 
and adequate reserves are set aside to guarantee their commitments to their 
retail policy holders. They do not pose problems of systemic stability unless 
they start using their reserves to take positions in risky assets of dubious 
value – as happened with AIG and US monoline insurers. 48 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
Thus, in general, systemic stability issues can only arise to the extent 
that depositors’ money is used to take capital market risks – which is 
precisely what happened in the financial excesses of the last decade. The 
entire paper pyramid underpinning the speculative bubble was built on a 
narrower and narrower deposit base, until confidence in the banking 
system collapsed. Then, the only way to stop depositors from fleeing was 
for the state to step in and guarantee bank liabilities, not only to retailers 
but also between the banks themselves.  
Therefore, in order to avoid a repetition of recent disasters, it appears 
that it would be sufficient to strengthen prudential rules on banks, so as to 
prevent them from leveraging their capital excessively and using 
depositors’ money again to take capital market risks, rather than making 
boring, but safer commercial loans. The rest of the financial system should 
be made fully transparent so as to ensure that risks are visible and correctly 
assessed by investors and regulators alike.   
This approach doesn’t require the legal separation of commercial and 
investment banking activities, or the prohibition of particular activities. It is 
sufficient to place high penalties on proprietary trading and lending to 
highly leveraged financial organisations by government-insured deposit 
institutions, as will be described in section 5. Once excessive leverage and 
liquidity risks are ruled out, deposit insurance should make it possible to 
let banks fail, safeguarding retail depositors but letting shareholders, 
bondholders and management take the full brunt of their mistakes. 
Once banks are made to behave with appropriate capital penalties, 
and depositors’ money is no longer used to cheaply finance capital market 
risks via bank lending to non-bank intermediaries, the other intermediaries 
are not in need of capital requirements, lending of last resort and 
prudential supervision;33 when they make mistakes and lose all their 
capital, they can go bust without endangering systemic stability. 
To the extent that financial intermediation may still globally lead to 
excessive leverage and threaten systemic stability, due to the build-up of 
excessive assets and liability positions by countries and national banking 
systems under conditions of lax aggregate policy management, collective 
macro-prudential surveillance mechanisms should be able to sound an 
                                                      
33 This view was eloquently argued by Andrew Large, former Deputy Governor of 
the Bank of England and Chairman of the SIB, the FSA predecessor, in his editorial 
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early warning by calling attention to destabilising policies as well as 
unbalanced positions of systemically relevant financial institutions. 
4.2  Supervision by objectives 
The second paramount issue in designing an adequate regulatory 
architecture concerns the structure and organisation of financial markets 
supervision in a globalised context.  
While there is a consensus on the need for closer cooperation at the 
international level, clearly the creation of a world supervisory authority 
endowed with far-reaching legal powers over national financial markets is 
a chimera. In practice, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has already 
emerged as the leading forum for cooperation and concerted decisions by 
national governments and regulators.  
The FSF was established by the G-7 finance ministers and central 
bank governors in 1999, following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, in order 
to promote international financial stability through enhanced information 
exchange and cooperation in financial market supervision. Currently, it 
comprises national financial authorities (central banks, supervisory 
authorities and finance ministries) from the G-7 countries plus Australia, 
Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland and the European 
Central Bank. At its plenary meeting in London, on 11-12 March 2009, the 
FSF decided to invite as new members the G-20 countries not present in its 
membership: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. Spain and the European 
Commission have also been asked to join.34 
The crisis has exposed the weakness of present arrangements for the 
supervision of financial markets, both regarding the ‘horizontal’ 
fragmentation of competencies among a host of different authorities within 
countries, and the ‘vertical’ distribution of competencies, where national 
entities are solely in charge of supervision of supra-national financial 
                                                      
34 Brunnermeier et al. (2009) proposed not only to enlarge the FSF as it has 
happened, but also to designate a single representative at its meetings for each 
country, and to commit its members to implement FSF recommendations 
faithfully. This proposal obviously is very much influenced by the FSA model of a 
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conglomerates.35 As has been argued, national authorities have closed both 
eyes to the accumulated imbalances in their own banks and security 
houses, in order to let them compete successfully in the world stage.  See 
Table 6 for an overview of the regulatory structure of selected 
industrialised countries. 
The patchy system of regulation inevitably has kept financial markets 
fragmented, created loopholes and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage 
and entailed a costly multiplication of regulatory requirements and 
controls. National and international coordination among authorities is slow 
and cumbersome, with hundreds of bilateral and multilateral memoranda 
of understanding; colleges of supervisors on financial conglomerates have 
been inefficient and national participants have often not even effectively 
shared information among themselves. In this messy system, no regulator 
ever gets a unitary overall picture of financial markets, weakening investor 
(and taxpayer) protection, while transnational financial organisations must 
live with a multiplicity of rules and inordinate regulatory burdens. A 
realistic approach would be to start by centralising the organisation of 
regulation and supervision within large geographical areas – i.e. the United 
States, the European Union and the Pacific – and then establishing close 
coordination of these macro-area regulators at global level. 
In the United States, the Paulson blueprint (US Treasury, 2008) 
proposed a drastic simplification of present rules, in favour of a system of 
regulation by objective in which the Federal Reserve would oversee long-
term macro-stability for all financial entities, irrespective of their legal 
status, and there would be side by side a micro-prudential regulator and a 
conduct of business regulator. 
Within the EU, a coordinating role for implementing regulation was 
entrusted to the so-called ‘Level Three Committees’36 – CEBS for banks, 
CEIOPS for insurance and pension funds and CESR for securities markets – 
which however have no legal powers and depend wholly on their 
                                                      
35 C. Di Noia, “A proposal on financial regulation in Europe for the next European 
Council”, Vox, 20 October 2008.  
36 According to the so-called Lamfalussy procedure, Level Three Committees 
composed by national regulators should issue guidelines for coordinating national 
implementation of directives (Level One) and implementing measures issued by 
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constituent authorities, with their competences determined according to an 
obsolescent institution-based framework.  
Table 6. Regulatory structure of selected industrial countries 
 Banks  Securities  Insurance  Establish-
ment of 
integrated 
or unified 
supervisors 
(year) 
Organisa-
tional 
 model 
Central bank 
with primary 
responsibility 
for micro-
prudential 
supervision 
Australia P/C  1998  By  objectives  no 
Austria U  U U  2002  Unified  yesa 
Belgium U  U  U 2004  Unified  no 
Demark U  U  U 1988  Unified  no 
Finland BS  BS  I  1993  Integrated  nob 
France B  B/S  I    Sectoral/ 
by objective 
no 
Germany U U  U  2002  Unified  yesa 
Greece  CB  S  I   Sectoral yes 
Ireland U(CB)  U(CB) U(CB)  2003  Unified  yes 
Italy CB/S  CB/S  I    Sectoral/ 
by objective 
yes 
Japan U  U  U  2000  Unified  no 
Luxembourg BS  BS  I  1999  Integrated  no 
Netherlands P(CB)/C  2004  By  objectives  yes 
Portugal CB  CB/S  I    Sectoral/ 
by objective 
yes 
Spain  CB  S  I   Sectoral yes 
Sweden U  U  U 1991  Unified no 
UK U  U  U  1997  Unified  no 
US CB/B  S I    Sectoral/by 
objective/ 
functional 
no 
B = One or more authorities specialised in banking oversight. 
BS = Authority specialised in oversight of the banking sector and securities markets. 
C = Authority in charge of conduct of business supervision for all sectors. 
CB = Central bank. 
I = One or more authorities specialised in oversight of the insurance sector. 
P = Authority in charge of prudential supervision for all sectors. 
P (CB) = Central bank in charge of macro- and micro-prudential supervision for all sectors. 
S = One or more authorities specialised in oversight of securities markets. 
U = Single authority for all sectors. 
U (CB) = Unified regulator is an agency of the central bank. 
a Central bank is entrusted by law to conduct only specific supervisory tasks. 
b The integrated regulator is an independent agency of the central bank. 
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It is too early to aim for one central regulator and supervisor at the 
European level. Lacking a political union, there are still too many different 
rules: legal and institutional differences exist in commercial codes, 
company law, bankruptcy procedures and corporate governance, while 
policy-makers and taxpayers remain national. But is certainly too 
dangerous to keep the present situation with only national authorities. 
Lannoo (2008) has suggested a roadmap leading to the creation of a 
European Financial Institute laying the groundwork for the establishment 
of a European System of Financial Supervisors.37 Following up along the 
same lines, the de Larosière Group (2009) has proposed to transform the 
existing level three committees into three European authorities: a European 
Banking Authority, a European Insurance Authority and a European 
Securities Authority. Later on, CEBS and CEIOPS would be merged into 
one authority responsible for all micro-prudential supervision, thus 
converging on the US model described above. A new European Systemic 
Risk Council (ESRC), comprising the ECB General Council, the chairs of the 
authorities and the European Commission, would ensure overall 
coordination and oversight of aggregate developments. 
This proposal looks sensible and realistic; the only shortcoming is 
that the Group was not sufficiently daring to go further in its proposals on 
the timing of implementation.  
A more general framework of regulation and supervision by 
objectives could be designed as follows (Figure 5). Regulation and 
supervision would be arranged horizontally, at the European level, by 
objective – with separate agencies in charge of macroeconomic stability, 
microeconomic stability and investor protection for all intermediaries 
including insurers. A fourth ‘pillar’ would be represented by antitrust. 
Each of these authorities would have a federal structure, similar to that 
established for the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), with a 
central body and national supervisors active in the same field. The same 
structure of regulators by objectives could in due course be established also 
at national level.  
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Figure 5. An EU system of financial regulation  
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However – and this is a distinct merit of the approach of regulation 
by objectives – the set of European authorities as described above can be 
built upon the base of existing networks of regulators, without immediately 
calling into question national regulatory structures. The only requirement 
for the member states – besides relinquishing legal powers for 
implementing regulations – would be to identify a leading regulator in 
charge of participating in the three EU authorities and implementing their 
decisions nationally. 
An ingenious solution to turn present Level Three guidelines into 
binding decisions has been suggested by Wymeersch,38 chairman of CESR 
(Committee of European Securities Supervisors). Under his proposal, the 
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EU Commission could make use of its interpretive powers to homologate 
Level Three guidelines through an endorsement procedure similar to the 
one followed for the endorsement of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS).   
In this system, the European Central Bank would not be responsible 
for micro-prudential supervision, but would be given real powers to 
conduct macro-prudential supervision, together with lending of last resort. 
As suggested by President Trichet,39 this task would include the monitoring 
and analysis of financial stability, which the European Central Bank is 
already undertaking; developing early warning systems to detect risks in 
the financial system; conducting macro stress-testing exercises; and an 
advisory role on financial regulation and supervision from a financial 
stability perspective. The ESCB would have to be given full access to the 
supervisory information that is essential for their financial stability 
assessments. 
Finally, the credibility and independence of regulators remains a 
fundamental issue. Independent regulators had been one of the great 
advances in institutional design of the late 1970s and 1980s, but it now 
appears that they were freed of political meddling only to fall prey to their 
regulated entities, with enormous damage to their reputation. In the United 
States and the United Kingdom, central banks have lost their 
independence. The question will not go away: we will again one day need a 
strong system of regulation, independent from politicians but also from 
market actors. 
5.  The regulator’s tool box 
It is quite obvious that the systemic tendency of financial intermediaries to 
over-leverage their capital and undertake excessive risks was not countered 
by regulation, and in fact was favoured by loopholes generated by the 
existence of different rules in different jurisdictions. Over the recent past, 
quite a few policy reports were issued by influential academic circles, 
private policy institutes and official expert groups analysing where the 
problems arose and outlining more or less radical overhauls of financial 
markets rules (G-30, 2009, Brunnermeier et al., 2009 and de Larosière 
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Group, 2009). Each of them contains useful analysis and recommendations 
that should receive due consideration, although the list of measures 
collectively proposed would surely amount to a regulatory overshoot that 
we may come to repent.  
It may also be recalled that already in April 2008 the Financial 
Stability Forum issued a report on “Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience” (Financial Stability Forum, 2008a) with many sensible 
recommendations addressing five areas where rules needed tightening: 
prudential oversight of capital and of liquidity and risk management; 
transparency and asset valuation; changes in the role and uses of credit 
ratings; the authorities’ responsiveness to risks; and arrangements for 
dealing with stress in the financial system. 
A main focus in those recommendations is precisely on closing 
loopholes that create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Advocates of 
new rules should not overlook the fact that many of the recommendations 
have been already implemented (as described in Financial Stability Forum, 
2008b) or will be implemented soon: therefore, one should not try to fix 
what has already been fixed.  
Rather than trying to describe in full a new regulatory set-up, we 
have therefore concentrated our attention on the adaptation of a few main 
rules that already exist: they notably concern capital requirements, 
management incentives and governance of financial intermediaries, and the 
transparency of balance sheets and financial products. 
5.1  Capital requirements 
The fundamental function of regulatory capital is to avoid excessive risk-
taking by banks, thus compensating for moral hazard stemming from state 
support in case of failure, lending of last resort and deposit insurance. 
The first global rules for capital requirements were agreed in Basle in 
1988 and entered into force in Europe with the Own Funds and Solvency 
Ratio Directives40 in 1989: they were based on a simple rule linking capital 
to be set aside in relation to assets, according to parameters dealing with 
the nature of the counterparty – governments, banks and other 
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counterparties.41 The Basle I Accord represented an important step in 
strengthening bank capital, but created an incentive to buy riskier assets 
belonging to the same type of counterparty, in order to obtain greater 
returns. Therefore, after some minor modifications in 1996, the accord was 
completely revised in 2004, leading to the so-called Basle II Accord. Basle II 
tried to overcome the weaknesses of the previous system by shifting to a 
capital formula calculated on the basis of risk-weighted assets; the result 
has been in practice to reduce capital requirements.42 
Basle II only entered into force in Europe at the beginning of 2008 and 
was not even applied in the US: so it cannot be held responsible for the 
financial crisis (Cannata & Quagliariello, 2009). However, there is little 
doubt that it would have aggravated, and not addressed, the massive 
increase in leverage that accumulated in the five years before the crisis. In 
fact, Basle II entails a strong delegation of responsibilities from supervisors 
to bank management and external entities, i.e. rating agencies called to 
validate ‘standardised’ risk assessment models, and the supervised entities 
themselves when they choose to develop their own risk-assessment 
‘internal models’.  
More importantly, capital requirements came to be wholly 
misinterpreted by bank management during the long upswing in stock 
prices: keeping a buffer of capital over the minimum was seen as a waste of 
resources, so that the floor became in fact a ceiling. CDSs (credit default 
swaps) or Triple-A securitised assets were purchased in large amounts to 
minimize capital requirements.43 It is interesting to note that banks were 
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OECD countries needed less capital than those to banks in non-OECD countries) 
and possible guarantees on exposures. 
42 The quantitative impact studies (QIS) conducted by the Basle Committee on 
banking supervision prior to implementation of the accord clearly showed that 
there would be a reduction in capital requirements. Between December 2007 and 
June 2008, the first period of application of the accord, there was a 9.6% reduction 
in total risk-weighted assets in the 12 leading European banks (R&S – Mediobanca, 
2008). 
43 See for example the annual report of AIG for 2007 (p. 122): “Approximately $379 
billion (consisting of the corporate loans and prime residential mortgages) of the 
$527 billion in notional exposure of AIGFP’s super senior credit default swap 
portfolio as of December 31, 2007 represents derivatives written for financial 
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not only the largest buyers of protection through CDSs, but also their main 
sellers, even if on balance their demand exceeded supply (Table 7); hedge 
funds ranked second; insurance providers were only third, and large net 
suppliers of CDSs. Finally, both Basle I and Basle II encouraged the 
explosion of the interbank market, which later turned out to be a major 
source of instability, because it tends to assign a very low ranking to assets, 
e.g. interbank deposits and bonds, held vis-à-vis other banks. 
Table 7. Market share of financial intermediaries in credit derivatives (%) 
 Protection  buyers  Protection sellers 
 2004  2006  2004  2006 
Banks 67  59  54  43 
Hedge funds  16  28  15  31 
Pension funds  3  2  4  4 
Insurance 7  6  20  17 
Corporations 3  2  2  1 
Mutual funds  3  2  4  3 
Other 1  1  1  1 
Source: IMF (2008a). 
With hindsight, it is apparent that the Basle approach to regulatory 
capital is fundamentally flawed since it creates incentives for risk 
mitigation strategies, and hence cannot adequately protect depositors and 
systemic financial stability. In practice, this was the device that made it 
possible for European banks – under the sympathetic eyes of their national 
regulators – to increase their leverage up to the irresponsible levels 
comparable to Wall Street investment banks, so as to let them cut their slice 
of juicy profits, but also inevitably massive and ill-understood risks.  
In October 2008, the European Commission presented proposals 
entailing some tightening of the capital requirements directive, so as to 
limit the most obvious circumventions of the substance of the rules.44 But 
                                                                                                                                       
institutions, principally in Europe, for the purpose of providing them with 
regulatory capital relief rather than risk mitigation.” 
44 Among the main changes proposed are: improving the management of large 
exposures (banks will be restricted in lending beyond a certain limit to any one 
party, including other banks); improving supervision of cross-border banking 
groups; improving the quality of banks' capital (there will be clear EU-wide criteria 
for assessing whether hybrid capital is eligible to be counted as part of a bank’s 
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they missed the basic point: we must scrap risk weighting and move to a 
capital requirement refereed to total assets, regardless of composition. In 
other words, under no circumstances should banks be allowed to exceed a 
total leverage ratio, which should be set reasonably low, no larger than ten, 
with no room for risk mitigation or exemption clauses. Clearly, there 
should be no special treatment or exemption for interbank operations, 
which should pay the normal capital charge. 
Moreover, there is a need to restore simplicity in the writing of rules: 
capital rules did not work properly and have been circumvented for two 
technical reasons.  
The first one is excessive complexity of the definition of capital: Tier 1 
capital consisting of equity capital, including non-cumulative preferred 
shares, and disclosed reserves; Tier 2 capital, further comprising 
supplementary capital, i.e. undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, 
general provisions, hybrid instruments and subordinated term debt; Tier 3 
capital, consisting of short-term subordinated debt covering market risk. In 
sum, there are many items with little resemblance to equity, whose actual 
utility in case of illiquidity or insolvency is unclear. This fog should be 
cleared by reverting to the simplest possible definition of capital, namely 
equity and cash reserves.  
The second reason for the failure of capital rules is that each country 
has implemented capital requirements differently, most often through 
secondary legislation issued by the banking supervisor. In these domains it 
is high time to move to full harmonisation, either by using regulations 
rather than directives when writing legislation or by entrusting 
implementing powers to Level Three Committees, notably in this case.  
Two further refinements are in order. First, the standard capital 
requirement should apply to standard banking businesses, such as 
commercial and investment lending, but an extra capital requirement 
should be imposed on activities that go further. These may include risky 
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management for securitised products (rules on securitised debt will be tightened: 
originators will be required to retain some risk exposure). Cf. European 
Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks 
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activities such as brokers’ loans, lending to highly leveraged institutions 
and leveraged lending in general. A general way of looking at this penalty 
is that whenever money is lent to non-bank intermediaries which then on-
lend it again, the bank is less able to assess the risk associated with the final 
claim and therefore a presumption arises that risk is higher. Those non-
bank intermediaries, being confronted with a penalty rate on their bank 
borrowing, would be encouraged to seek cheaper funding in capital 
markets, where sophisticated investors would decide by themselves 
whether they want to take those risks, and at what price, given their 
estimate of potential losses.   
Capital penalties also seem in order on the banks’ open positions in 
their proprietary trading portfolio, notably when it includes securities or 
contracts that are not standardised and whose value is difficult to 
determine, e.g. because they are not traded through a clearinghouse and 
regular settlement system.  
Finally, recent events have made it painfully clear that size matters 
perversely in generating systemic risks, since behemoth banking 
institutions are at the same times too large to fail and too large to be 
effectively managed and controlled. The implicit incentives to undertake 
excessive risks to raise returns, potentially at the expense of taxpayers, 
again seem to justify an extra capital penalty, with maximum permitted 
leverage decreasing with size beyond passing size threshold. 
The purpose of all these penalties is clear: whenever a depositor’s 
money is used outside the typical domain of banking business, there is a 
presumption that the bank is using the banking franchise to take inordinate 
risks, on the assumption that the taxpayer will bear exceptional losses. By 
placing an extra capital charge on all these activities, and on the systemic 
risk implicit in size, the distortion in incentives created by deposit 
insurance and state backing in case of failure is compensated by reducing 
expected returns. 
Capital requirements could also be used anti-cyclically, as has been 
prominently proposed by Charles Goodhart (2008) and, lately, 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009). The simple idea behind this proposal is that all 
rapid accelerations in bank lending should be discouraged by raising 
capital charges, thus putting a break on the inherent instability of banking. 
The proposal has in fact already been tested by the Bank of Spain, which 
since 2000 has adopted a ‘dynamic provisioning’ system that increases 
capital charges on banks in response to past credit accelerations; provisions 60 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
are also required for expected losses on the non-impaired portfolio, in 
order to build up a fund during upswings which may be drawn upon in 
downswings. 
In assessing this proposal, one should not overlook that, to the extent 
that credit booms are generated by lax monetary and financial policies, the 
introduction of specific ‘brakes’ on banks may still prove insufficient in 
countering instability due to destabilising macroeconomic policies. 
5.2  Fixing management incentives 
As been discussed, the events leading to the financial crisis have exposed a 
tendency of management in financial intermediaries to take excessive risks. 
Two issues seem prominent here: the possible distortions in the design of 
compensation packages, in particular for listed companies; and the 
balancing of competing interests in governance arrangements of financial 
institutions. 
During the run-up to the speculative bubble, many large 
intermediaries designed pay packages so as to attract the best traders and 
investment bankers and to keep them in face of stiff competition; this 
became a main factor pushing intermediaries to seek ever-larger returns. To 
this end, the salary structure was heavily skewed in favour not only of the 
variable component, but also of short-term returns that were readily cashed 
in. Profit estimates in quarterly reports were increasingly bent to show fast-
rising profits, which were immediately distributed in the form of stock 
options, not infrequently backdated. In practice stock prices were pushed 
up by immediately writing future profits in the books, with no provisions 
for potential losses at the time of liquidating the operation. Thus, it was one 
way bets all over the place – with the taxpayer playing the residual loss-
taker.  
This dramatic distortion in incentive was enhanced, first, by the 
transformation of investment and brokerage house from unlimited 
partnerships into limited-liability companies, therefore only responsible for 
losses up to invested capital;45 and, second, by listing investment banking 
houses on the stock exchange, which facilitated the immediate liquidation 
of management gains while the risk stayed with shareholders. In turn, 
shareholders, lured by seemingly unending stock appreciation, 
increasingly overlooked their responsibilities to monitor management and 
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risk-taking, precisely when further increases in their stock should have 
been seen with concern.  
Redesigning management incentive requires some caution in order 
not to stifle the incentive to innovate, and also not to bring about new 
distortions and perverse incentives. In this regard, absolute limits on pay, 
as have been introduced in many financial organisations that have fallen 
into government hands, may seem attractive to soothe an enraged public 
opinion, but do not seem to provide a very good solution in the long run – 
at least unless they can be uniformly imposed across all jurisdictions – since 
they are likely to keep away good management and attract lower-quality 
staff. Another aspect that should be borne in mind is that a reduction in the 
share of variable pay is likely to lead to demands for higher fixed 
remuneration, thus increasing fixed costs and depressing profitability for 
all shareholders.  
Thus the question basically remains one of good design of variable 
compensations, and how best to align them with the creation of long-term 
value for shareholders. This fundamental point is not contradicted by the 
events leading to the financial crisis. However, some radical changes in 
past practices are in order.  
First of all, while it is important that the variable part of 
compensation remains dominant, according to the CEO at Goldman Sachs, 
“an individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid 
excessive risk taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to 
future delivery and or deferred action”.46 In this context, some have 
proposed to go one step further and use ‘claw back’ clauses, whereby a 
manager’s pay can be claimed back in order to cover subsequent losses 
from his or her actions and operations, even after leaving the company; 
however, how to implement such a clause remains controversial. 
In any event, the variable part of compensation should be paid in 
shares in order to eliminate perverse incentives linked to stock options. 
Stock grants – never free under any circumstance, but against payment at a 
discount with respect to the market price of company shares – should only 
be assigned after positive results materialise in the medium term. 
Furthermore, the sale of shares thus obtained should be restricted with long 
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vesting periods, e.g. a minimum of 5-7 years or retirement, and be subject 
to other conditions. An example is provided by the conditions attached by 
Warren Buffett to his $5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs: Chief 
Executive Lloyd Blankfein and three other top executives agreed that they 
won't part with more than 10% of their common-stock holdings until 
October 2011, unless the company first redeems Mr. Buffett’s perpetual 
preferred shares.47 
Option plans should have long vesting periods, years rather than 
months. More importantly, maximum transparency should be given to the 
remuneration process. The voice of the general meeting of shareholders on 
remuneration policy should be strengthened, together with board 
responsibilities in setting the compensation, which should be based on 
expert advice by independent consultants not chosen by the management. 
Changing the pay mechanism will not suffice. There is also a need to 
restore an appropriate balance in the governance arrangement, notably by 
strengthening the weight of risk control vis-à-vis profit centres. As we have 
argued, the distribution of returns in financial markets creates favourable 
conditions for ‘disaster myopia’ by those who are engaged in generating 
returns by taking risk – something completely overlooked by mainstream 
efficient market economics. 
T h i s  t e n d e n c y  m u s t  b e  k e p t  i n  c h e c k  b y  g i v i n g  m o r e  w e i g h t  i n  
management decisions to those charged with controlling risks and 
preserving the organisation’s viability. There is plenty of evidence that 
often the dangers of excessive risk-taking were spotted perfectly well by 
risk-control managers, but their opinion was promptly swept under the 
carpet. In quite a few instances, those who insisted in raising objections 
were side-lined or even fired. In general, their position in the organisations 
did not allow them to impose their view; and even when they were able to 
expose the situation to the board, they were not understood, given the low 
level of technical knowledge of many board members of financial 
institutions. 
This problem can be fixed by appropriate organisational changes. 
Risk management and control need to be made fully independent of profit 
centres and directly accountable to an independent audit committee and, 
eventually, to the board. Executives s h o u l d  i n  n o  w a y  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  
influence the performance assessments nor the pay and career of risk 
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managers, whose pay and ranking in the organisational structure should be 
adequate. And, “if there is a question about the value of a position or a 
disagreement about a risk limit, the risk manager’s view should always 
prevail” (Blankfein, Financial Times, 8 February 2008). 
In managing risk, the size of the organisation matters too. The past 
decade has seen not only the widespread adoption of the universal banking 
model but also the emergence of unwieldy large financial conglomerates, 
defined as “any group of companies under common control whose 
exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services 
in at least two different financial sectors – banking, securities, insurance …” 
(Bank for International Settlements, 1995). In practice, all large international 
financial organisations are financial conglomerates in this definition. 
Already in 2000, over 80% of the assets of the largest 500 banking 
organisations were controlled by financial conglomerates, and among the 
largest 50 banking groups the proportion reached 94% (Huertas, 2006). 
The organisational structure of conglomerates differs across 
countries, depending in part on legal constraints on the organisation of 
cross-border or cross-sector businesses – e.g. by requiring the creation of a 
separate subsidiary to perform certain activities or operate in particular 
jurisdictions. Most large conglomerates may be subject to multiple 
bankruptcy procedures and to multiple schemes of depositors, 
policyholders and investor protection, as well as having access to multiple 
lenders of last resort. 
Due to their sheer size, and also to this multiplicity of business and 
regulatory environments, large financial conglomerates pose 
extraordinarily complex challenges in risk management and control. They 
have hundreds of subsidiaries and affiliates, sometimes with different 
accounting principles, different auditors, if any, different geographical 
areas, including tax havens. It is not clear how to solve these obstacles: at a 
minimum, a way must be found so as to make them subject to one 
overarching supervisor, capable of imposing sound risk-management 
oversight over the entire range of operations of the conglomerate 
worldwide. The imposition of appropriate regulatory disincentives would 
compel them to reduce size and complexity.  
5.3  About transparency and market integrity 
A specific area where risk management and control by financial 
organisations proved especially weak concerned derivatives and 64 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
securitised assets, instruments that by and large were traded over the 
counter. Trading over the counter had reached astounding dimensions: 
between June 2006 and June 2008, their notional amount almost doubled 
(Table 8).  
Table 8. Amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives, by risk category and 
instrument ($ trillions) 
Notional amounts outstanding  Risk category/ instrument 
Jun 06  Dec 06  Jun 07  Dec 07  Jun 08 
Total  contracts  370.2 414.8 516.4 595.3 683.7 
Foreign  exchange  contracts  38.1 40.3 48.6 56.2 63.0 
Interest rate contracts  262.5  291.6  347.3  393.1  458.3 
Equity-linked  contracts  6.8 7.5 8.6 8.5  10.2 
Commodity  contracts  6.4 7.1 7.6 8.4  13.2 
Credit default swaps  20.3  28.6  42.6  57.9  57.3 
Unallocated    36.0 39.7 61.7 71.1 81.7 
Source: BIS, Semi-annual OTC derivatives statistics 2008. 
Over-the-counter (OTC) products were especially liked since were 
typically tailor-made to suit the specific risk characteristics demanded by 
investors. The other side of the coin is their lack of liquidity and direct 
exposure to counterparty risk, which investors thought would be overcome 
by model valuation, either internal or by rating agencies. It is now well 
known that this part of the game did not work out satisfactorily.  
The obvious solution to the liquidity and counterparty risk problems 
would be to channel these trades through organised clearing platforms, as 
originally proposed by Cecchetti,48 with two positive effects: the 
standardisation of the financial instruments, facilitating transparency and 
liquidity, and the imposition of margins on the holders, so that the 
counterparty risk would be spread over all participants in the 
clearinghouse. Furthermore, adequate capital requirements on the 
clearinghouses and monitoring by market supervisors would make 
available effective and timely information on potential systemic risks. 
Schemes for the centralisation of CDS trades have already been tabled by 
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the European Commission (2009b), with agreement by the industry. Similar 
proposals are under discussion in the United States. 
Creating organised clearing and settlement platforms for these 
products does not imply that their use should be made compulsory. A 
better solution would be to create appropriate incentives and disincentives, 
for instance by applying taxing capital penalties to OTC products in banks’ 
portfolios and requiring full separate disclosure of OTC positions.   
Then we must deal with rating agencies. As well understood by the 
de Larosière Group Report (2009), both in the United States and in the 
European Union rating agencies have come to play a “quasi-regulatory 
role”, as a consequence in the former case of registration,49 and in the latter 
of the role attributed to their ratings by a number of EU directives. 
In particular, Basle II strongly encourages recourse to rating agencies 
both for the evaluation of standardised valuation models and risk 
exposure. At the same time, their ‘quasi public’ nature has induced 
regulators to lift regulatory requirements: for instance, in the market abuse 
directive all recommendations on financial instruments – including analyst 
reports or newspaper articles – are subject to an obligation of fair 
representation and disclosure of interest conflicts, while rating agencies’ 
reports were explicitly exempted from those rules.50 
These rules have created a misguided perception of reliability of 
ratings, whereby investors and intermediaries have abdicated their 
responsibility to independently assess the quality of their assets. Moreover, 
they have strengthened the market power of a few incumbents under a 
regulatory franchise. 
Looking forward, at the very moment when investors are asked to 
take back their full responsibilities in assessing assets quality and 
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counterparty risk, a more consistent approach would have been to strip 
rating agencies of all regulatory privileges, making them irrelevant and 
letting them compete for customers as private entities.  
A fundamental pillar of financial markets is trust built on 
informational transparency. A critical requirement in this regard is that 
periodical reporting documents must fully represent all risks, including 
those that may derive to the organisation from controlled entities, which 
must be fully identified and consolidated when appropriate. The substance 
of this principle has been systematically and massively evaded; therefore, 
an overhaul of accounting principles, auditing practices and supervision is 
urgent, and the revised rules must apply to all the main financial markets. 
In this regard, it would be a bad mistake to limit or eliminate 
international accounting standards, which have now been adopted widely 
around the world – while even the US regulators are considering their 
recognition. True, mark-to-market valuations have amplified the cyclical 
swelling and contraction of balance sheets, compounding instability. But 
this was by no means required under proper application of the IFRS 
(International Financial Regulatory System). It was a degeneration that 
made it possible for intermediaries to book immediately short-term gains 
on their assets during the upswing, but came to haunt them in the 
downswing. And at that time they started screaming for the suspension of 
the accounting principles; national authorities, desperate to stop the 
downward spiral, promptly obliged, without much understanding of the 
implications.  
In reality, the IFRS fair value principles are fine, their application was 
rotten. Auditors and supervisors should have resisted complacent 
interpretations designed to swell balance sheets beyond reason. Sensible 
estimates of fair value based on longer time horizons and considered 
evaluation of underlying fundamental variables would have led to much 
less destabilising results. 
Transparency may also provide much of the solution to the question 
of how best to regulate private pools of capital such as hedge funds and 
private equity. This is needed by intermediaries that may be relevant for 
the functioning of the financial market. Proposals are on the table from the 
industry and from the regulators on private equity and hedge funds.51 It is 
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far from clear that these intermediaries, albeit highly leveraged, have 
contributed much to recent instability; rather, they have taken their losses 
in earnest and have in many cases shown adequate capital and reserves. 
Clearly, the lesson of the LTCM failure in the late 1990s was learned. As we 
have argued, there is no solid argument to extend prudential regulation to 
these intermediaries. Enhanced transparency on their exposure and risks 
will suffice, and should be made available to investors, supervisors and the 
market at large.  
6.  Coping with an unstable macro-financial environment 
As has been argued, the principal cause of financial instability has not been 
lax regulation, hedge and private equity funds, and exotic financial 
products – although all these played a role in permitting reckless behaviour 
by bankers and financiers and spreading its consequences worldwide. Nor 
was there a major role of the offshore tax and financial havens, which are 
now branded by politicians as chief culprits: obviously, the main misdeeds 
took place at the very centre of financial capitalism, in New York and 
London, Tokyo, Frankfurt and Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin, Madrid 
and Zurich. 
Financial instability has been first and foremost generated by 
unstable macro-financial policies in the United States and by international 
monetary arrangements, since the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 
early 1970s, which rather than promoting adjustment of payments 
imbalance, have permitted their explosion and the unsustainable 
accumulation of assets and liabilities going with it. Therefore, as important 
as they are, tightening the screws of regulation and improving market 
discipline for financial organisations will not suffice to bring about a more 
stable global environment: reform of international monetary arrangements 
is also needed. 
A complete blueprint of reform is beyond the scope of this study, but 
we describe some basic ingredients of a reformed system that cannot be left 
out. A main premise is that a return to fixed exchange rates between the 
main economic areas of the world is neither feasible nor desirable, given 
the enormous differences in their economic and social systems.   
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The first ingredient of reform is restoring some shared rules of the 
game for international adjustment, since financing current payment 
imbalances without adjustment would lead us again onto an unstable 
financial path. These rules must include symmetric external discipline on 
domestic policies for all countries – including the United States, which has 
dramatically abused its status as main reserve currency country – and 
appropriate arrangements to let exchange rates move to help correct 
current payment imbalances, under strengthened International Monetary 
Fund surveillance. 
The new system should provide early warnings of the build-up of 
systemic risks and sanctions for divergent countries following unstable 
policies, as already envisaged under the EU internal policy surveillance 
apparatus. It should also have effective tools for the International Monetary 
Fund to manage international liquidity crises – as a true world lender of 
last resort – and provide effective assistance to countries confronted by 
destabilising capital outflows (Eichengreen, 1999).52 A crucial condition to 
ensure effective surveillance of global imbalances and global systemic risk 
by the International Monetary Fund is its independence in performing this 
function. With this aim in mind, Gros has proposed that the IMF Executive 
Board, currently composed only of representatives of member countries, be 
enlarged to include three to five independent members. 
Agreement on these rules and their subsequent political monitoring 
could usefully be entrusted to the G-20, which is emerging as the 
prominent candidate to run world economic and monetary affairs in the 
new hoped-for era of cooperation. The G-20 ministers of finance and central 
bank governors could conceivably take over the steering role of the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and become the 
locus for the coordination of macroeconomic policies between the major 
economic areas of the world, through binding rules managed by a 
permanent secretariat staffed by top officials from its member states, as 
well as guide the IMF’s surveillance over the policies of its members; the 
IMFC could be transformed into a Council to oversee the International 
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Monetary Fund, as already envisaged by the Articles of Agreement.53 The 
IMF (and World Bank) quotas and governing structure should be adjusted 
to reflect the new equilibria in the world economic and financial 
community: the savings imbalances will not be remedied as long as the 
largest creditor states are kept on the fringe of the governing bodies of 
global institutions and IMF polices are decided by the United States 
together with a small clique of advanced countries. 
Of course, all this is easier said than done: but the overall goal should 
be clear to the G-20 representatives who will meet in London on April 2nd 
and subsequently in other fora charged with restoring stability and vitality 
to the global financial system.  
Managing world payment imbalances may require more than 
improved coordination of national macroeconomic policies. Payment 
imbalances have structural causes that must be squarely confronted. 
The past two decades have been characterised by low-wage growth 
in advanced countries, reflecting the forces of globalisation and technical 
change. We deluded ourselves that the problem would be resolved by 
investing in human capital and moving workers in advanced countries up 
the skill curve. In practice, this has not happened: large layers of advanced 
societies have been living with declining real wages, leading to a 
permanently lower sustainable increase in domestic consumption (Turner, 
2008). Some countries made up for this shortfall in domestic demand by 
engineering a credit-driven consumption spree and housing price bubble: 
from the United States, to the United Kingdom and Ireland, Spain, the 
Baltic region and Eastern Europe, households piled up enormous debt 
using their inflated paper wealth as collateral.  
The United States emerged as the residual absorber of everybody 
else’s exports, building an enormous current account deficit. In other 
advanced countries, low growth of domestic demand resulted in large 
external surpluses and an export-oriented economic structure, the 
prominent examples being Japan and Germany. Meanwhile, China and 
other Asian exporters have built massive excess capacity for the production 
of cheap manufacturing exports, while their domestic absorption capacity, 
as a share of GDP, has remained constant or declined. Meanwhile large 
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surpluses have also re-emerged in oil-exporting countries. Figure 6 
summarises the resulting structure of world current external payments.  
Figure 6. World payment imbalances, average 2004-07 
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Sources: IMF, 2008 and World Economic Outlook database, 2009. 
On closer inspection, it appears that there are two main subsystems 
(Wolf, 2009). One comprises the United States and the Asian surplus 
countries, linked by managed dollar exchange rates and massive transfers 
of capital from Asia to the US capital markets; substantial undervaluation 
of Asian currencies exerts strong downward pressure on US real wages. 
The other subsystem is the euro area, which has roughly balanced external 
payments with the rest of the world, but large imbalances inside, with 
Germany in large surplus and the others in deficit, and imperfectly 
integrated capital markets limiting offsetting direct investment. Here too 
exchange rates cannot move to eliminate payment imbalances; Germany’s 
superior productivity and wage moderation maintain constant pressure on 
real wage growth in euro-area partners, slowing domestic demand and 
GDP growth through the entire area, while ‘corporatist’ economic 
structures retard needed changes in the patterns of industrial 
specialisation. Both subsystems have seen their internal imbalances 
growing over time, thank also to divergent macroeconomic policies; low 
growth of domestic demand is likely to characterise both of them, with the 
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Clearly, payment imbalances cannot be eliminated unless the real 
exchange rates of emerging countries in Asia appreciate substantially, and 
domestic wages and income accelerate throughout the region; these 
countries must turn inwards and deploy their gigantic savings for housing, 
social welfare and the environment. Only with substantial real appreciation 
of their currencies and higher growth of domestic income will there be 
sufficient room for more rapid wage and income growth in advanced 
countries. 
Within the euro area, adjustment requires that relative prices and 
wages in Germany move in favour of services and domestic consumption 
and output composition changes accordingly. Substantial direct investment 
should flow from the strong to the weak economies to correct for 
competitive imbalances. Without this extra stimulus and much extra-
flexibility to adapt economic structures to changing relative wages, the 
internal market and even the euro might not survive a protracted period of 
high unemployment and low growth. Orthodox nation-based policies 
repeated as a litany by German policy-makers cannot fix the problem; 
macroeconomic policies must be effectively coordinated within the area to 
bring about the required changes in real exchange rates and the 
composition of aggregate demand. 
For the time being, these issues have not gained the attention they 
deserve on the international reform agenda. And yet, failure to address 
them might permanently depress economic growth worldwide and lead to 
the breakdown of international cooperation and a return to protectionism, 
as in the 1930s. 
The last bit of international reform that must be mentioned concerns 
the role of the euro and the issue of Union bonds. Clearly, international 
monetary discipline would be strengthened by the existence of a fully-
fledged alternative to the US dollar as a reserve currency. What is missing 
for the euro to play this role is a large and liquid market of Union bonds 
denominated in euro. Ample demand for these bonds is certain to come 
from large sovereign investors that would be more than happy to diversify 
their reserve holdings in favour of non-dollar assets.   
The resources thus raised could be d e p l o y e d  i n  E u r o p e  t o  f o s t e r  
structural adjustment, improve the environment, and create world-class 
transport, communication and energy networks, thus imparting a strong 
stimulus to domestic demand. They could also be used to strengthen 
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of payments of EU members not using the euro, as well as nearby 
neighbours with similar difficulties, who are experiencing severe strains in 
their external positions. 
There has been, in this regard, insufficient awareness among policy-
makers that Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Russia and the neighbouring 
countries are the areas under acutest strain outside the advanced countries: 
as is manifest from Table 9, most countries in the area show the highest 
value of risk exposure. Their difficulties tend to be mutually reinforcing, 
raising the spectre of a regional currency and sovereign debt crisis, which 
would severely impact the banking system of the European Union. The 
Union would in all likelihood end up spending less and sparing much 
trouble if it were to launch a large-scale preventive support operation 
designed to stabilise all of their currencies and financial systems, rather 
than by meeting individual crises one by one, as they unfold. 
Table 9. Vulnerability of selected economies to the global credit crunch 
Country Current  account 
as % of GDP 
Short-term debt  
as % of reserves* 
Banks’ loan/  
deposit ratio 
Overall risk  
ranking** 
South Africa  -10.4  81  1.09  17 
Hungary -4.3  79  1.30 16 
Poland -8.0  38 1.03  14= 
South Korea  1.3  102  1.30  14= 
Mexico -2.5  39 0.93  12= 
Pakistan -7.8  27  0.99  12= 
Brazil -1.5  22  1.36  10= 
Turkey -2.3  70 0.83  10= 
Russia 1.5  28  1.51  9 
Argentina 0.2  63  0.74  8 
Venezuela 0.8  58  0.75  7 
Indonesia 1.2  88  0.6  2 6 
Thailand 0.3  17  0.88 5 
India -2.4  9  0.74  4 
Taiwan 7.9  26 0.87  3 
Malaysia 11.3  15  0.72 2 
China 5.2  7  0.68  1 
* 2009 forecast. 
** Higher score implies higher risk. 
Source: The Economist, 28 February 2009. 
In general, the surreal discussion of this issue between European 
leaders has entirely overlooked the likelihood that capital spending for the 
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Union bonds; and that without Union bonds the cost will be borne by 
national budgets. Germany might have to pay a disproportionate share, 
since its banks are the most exposed to faltering neighbouring economies in 
the East and the other member states are in much weaker economic and 
financial conditions. 
The objections based on burden-sharing can be handled to everyone’s 
satisfaction by means of appropriate keys reflecting use of the funds. Even 
the objection that Union bonds would raise the cost of public borrowing by 
the member states with the highest credit standing sounds unconvincing 
for the very reason just mentioned: failure to intervene collectively might 
leave the strongest among them to carry much of the burden, and therefore 
the credit rating of Germany and France might suffer more from inaction 
than action, to the extent that a clear coordinated economic strategy might 
well reassure markets and increase the demand for both sovereign national 
and Union bonds.  
A practical scheme for a European Stabilisation Fund that would 
manage the funds thus raised has been proposed by Gros and Micossi 
(2008). The Fund could be set up quickly at the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), which is a Union agency already possessing the necessary expertise 
and comprising in its governing board the ministers of finance of the 
member states. Minor changes in the statutes of the EIB would give it the 
room of action needed to invest its funds for the purposes outlined above – 
including equity stakes in infrastructural projects or large banks in 
difficulty. 
7.  Our main proposals  
Our main conclusion on the origins of financial instability and our key 
policy recommendation draw directly on the insights expressed by a wise 
economist: a strong monetary anchor needs to be restored to the 
international monetary system, and regulators must effectively constrain 
the levels of leverage that financial organisations are able to accumulate 
(Leijonhufvud, 2009). 
Indeed, the primary source of instability must be seen in the repeated 
bouts of destabilising macroeconomic policies in the United States since the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates; 
international monetary arrangements amplified the effects of lax US polices 
by maintaining large exchange misalignments and financing, rather than 
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accumulation of net asset and liability positions generated enormous flows 
of capital to United States and other main financial centres, and a sequence 
of booms and bust in financial markets worldwide until the final implosion 
of the centre of the system. 
The urgent task at this juncture is to stabilise financial markets and 
halt the poisonous spiral of lower asset prices depressing economic activity, 
which in turn pushes asset prices even lower. The central issue is how to 
restore confidence in the banking system. To this end, the deployment of 
government money into insolvent banks should be accompanied by a 
straight takeover by the state, a restructuring phase and resale to private 
investors as soon as possible. A continuation of the policy of ‘handouts 
without proper workouts’, notably in the United States, cannot restore 
confidence and might lead us into a repetition of Japan’s ‘lost decade’ in the 
1990s. 
The crisis management tools available to the European Central Bank 
are narrower than those of other major central banks because, unlike the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, the European Central Bank is not 
backed by a fiscal authority. A way to tackle this weakness without 
compromising the ECB’s independence would be to create a European 
Fund which would issue Eurobonds and make the proceeds available to 
European institutions for their financial rescue operations.  
Once the crisis subsides, the world will need new monetary 
arrangements whereby payment imbalances are corrected by appropriate 
domestic policies in all the main countries and currency areas, and 
exchange rates can vary consistently with the requirements of international 
adjustment. In this sense, the quest for a monetary anchor must be 
answered by restoring external discipline on the policies of the main 
countries, rather than a new regime of fixed exchange rates that would not 
be viable. Agreement on such discipline will not come about unless the 
main emerging countries can take their proper place in international 
institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
The Group of Twenty appears as the best candidate to instigate and 
manage international policy cooperation at political level. 
Lax financial market regulation wasn’t the main culprit in the 
excesses that led to the speculative bubble, but it played an important 
permissive role in letting the leverage of financial organisations to build up 
to unsustainable levels. As asset prices accelerated, the incentive to create 
financial innovations to circumvent regulatory and prudential constraints 
became overwhelming, up to the eventual general crash.  KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 75 
 
In our view, there is no need to fundamentally change the regulatory 
architecture whereby prudential regulation basically concerns banking 
institutions, which are open to moral hazard because of deposit insurance, 
lending of last resort and the implicit state backing of the liabilities of large 
banks. We should also be aware that many important changes remedying 
past failures have already been implemented under the able stewardship of 
the Financial Stability Forum, which is emerging as the dominant forum for 
global governance of financial markets.   
Non-bank intermediaries, including private pools of capital, do not 
pose systemic stability risks unless they are financed cheaply by banks with 
depositors’ money; to the extent that this is avoided, it is not necessary to 
extend prudential regulation beyond the banking system. There is also no 
need to return to a system of legal separation between commercial and 
investment banking, provided there are sufficient disincentives and 
penalties for banks to engage in capital markets activities on their own 
account. 
Our main recipe for banking capital requirements is that Basle II rules 
should be scrapped and be substituted by a flat capital requirement 
calculated with reference to total assets, with no exemptions: the maximum 
permitted leverage ratio should never again be allowed to exceed a ceiling 
of ten. In addition, following the analysis above, special capital charges 
should be imposed on risky activities not belonging to normal banking 
business and possibly on excessive size. 
We also suggest a number of measures designed to strengthen risk 
management within financial organisations as well as transparency of 
information on all market participants and financial instruments. 
Appropriate incentives should push OTC instruments to migrate to 
organised clearing platforms. 
In Europe, a drastic simplification of the regulatory structure is in 
order to concentrate at EU level not only rule-making, which in the main 
has already been accomplished, but also rule implementation, as 
extensively discussed in the recent Report by the de Larosière Group 
(2009). In this context, it is high time that Level Three Committees be given 
legal powers in coordinating the implementation of EU directives. | 76 
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Appendix. Chronology of main events, 2007-09 
(up to 15 March 2009) 
Date Description 
United States 
31/07/07 Bear  Stearns  Two Bear Stearns hedge funds largely exposed to subprime 
mortgage-backed securities file for bankruptcy. 
14/03/08 Bear  Stearns  Bear Stearns gripped by liquidity crisis. The Federal Reserve and 
JPMorgan Chase provide secured funding to Bear Stearns, as 
necessary, for an initial period of 28 days. 
16/03/08  Bear Stearns  JPMorgan Chase announces the acquisition of Bear Stearns. 
24/03/08 Bear  Stearns  The Fed lends $29 bn to facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns 
by JPMorgan Chase. 
13/07/08  Fannie Mae 
Freddie Mac 
The Fed is authorised to lend to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
case of necessity. Temporary increase in the line of credit made 
available by the US Treasury to Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs); temporary authority for the Treasury to 
purchase GSEs equity.  
07/09/08  Fannie Mae 
Freddie Mac 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are placed into conservatorship. 
Senior preferred stocks purchase agreement between GSEs and 
Treasury (up to $100 bn). In return, $1 bn of senior preferred stock 
in each GSE and warrants on 79.9% of the common stock of each 
GSE. Treasury plan to purchase mortgage-backed securities of 
GSEs. New Treasury secured lending credit facilities to Freddie 
Mac, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks. 
15/09/08  Lehman 
Brothers 
Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11. It is the largest bankruptcy 
in the US history. 
15/09/08  Merrill Lynch 
Bank of America 
Bank of America acquires Merrill Lynch in a $50 bn all-stock 
transaction. 
16/09/08 AIG  Up to $85 bn loan granted by the Fed to AIG; the loan is 
collateralised by the assets of AIG. The US government receives a 
79.9% equity interest. 
18/09/08 Federal  Reserve $180 bn increase (up to $247 bn) of currency swap lines with the 
Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, 
the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Canada. 
21/09/08  Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding 
companies. 
24/09/08 Federal  Reserve The Fed establishes new currency swap lines (up to $30 bn) with 
the central banks of Australia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
25/09/08  Washington 
Mutual 
Washington Mutual is placed into the receivership of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). JPMorgan Chase acquires 
all deposits, assets and certain liabilities of Washington Mutual’s 
banking operations from the FDIC for $1.9 bn. 
 KEEP IT SIMPLE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 83 
 
Date Description 
29/09/08 Federal  Reserve Increase to $620 bn of total size of currency swap lines with other 
central banks. Tripling (up to $225 bn) of supply of 84-day 
maturity Term Auction Facility (TAF) credit. Introduction of 
forward TAF. 
29/09/08 
03/10/08 
Wachovia   Citigroup to acquire the banking operations of Wachovia in a 
transaction facilitated by a loss-sharing agreement with the FDIC. 
The bank is later taken over by Wells Fargo, which outbids Citi’s 
offer. 
08/10/08 AIG  Fed to borrow up to $37.8 bn in investment-grade, fixed-income 
securities from AIG in return for cash collateral. 
08/10/08  Federal Reserve  Target federal funds rate cut from 2% to 1.5%. 
13/10/08 Federal  Reserve Unlimited amount of US dollars made available through currency 
swap lines with the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank. 
28-
29/10/08 
Federal Reserve  The Fed establishes new currency swap lines with the central 
banks of New Zealand (up to $15 bn), Brazil, Korea, Mexico and 
Singapore (up to $30 bn). 
29/10/08  Federal Reserve  Target federal funds rate cut from 1.5% to 1%. 
10/11/08 AIG  The US Treasury announces the purchase of $40 bn of newly 
issued AIG preferred shares under TARP. Fed credit facility 
consequently reduced from $85 to $60 bn. The Fed creates for AIG 
a residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) facility (up to 
$22.5 bn) and a collateralised debt obligations facility (up to $30 
bn). The RMBS facility will lead to repayment and termination of 
the $37.8 bn facility established by the Fed on 08/10/08. 
23/11/08 Citigroup  Government guarantee on a Citigroup asset pool of 
approximately $306 billion of loans and securities backed by 
commercial and residential real estate and other similar assets. 
Losses to be absorbed by Citi up to $29 bn; further losses to be 
borne by the US Treasury (up to $5 bn), the FDIC (up to $10 bn) 
and Citi with a loss-sharing agreement. In exchange, Citi issues $4 
bn and $3 bn in preferred stock respectively to the US Treasury 
and the FDIC. Further residual losses to be absorbed by Citi and 
the Federal Reserve with a loss-sharing agreement (Citi 10%, Fed 
90%). 
$20 bn in senior preferred shares issued to the US Treasury.  
16/12/08  Federal Reserve  Target federal funds rate cut from 1% to a range of 0%-0.25%. 
16/01/09  Bank of America  Government guarantee on a pool of assets of Bank of America of 
approximately $118 bn, composed of loans, securities backed by 
residential and commercial real estate loans, and other similar 
assets. The assets, largely assumed through the acquisition of 
Merrill Lynch, will remain on Bank of America's balance sheet. In 
exchange, Bank of America will issue to the Treasury and the 
FDIC $4 bn of preferred shares. Bank of America will absorb 
losses up to $10 bn; 90% of further losses will be sustained by the 84 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
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Treasury and the FDIC, up to $10 bn. The Fed will absorb residual 
further losses through a non-recourse loan, subject to institution’s 
10% loss sharing. Bank of America will issue to the Treasury $20 
bn in preferred stock under the Targeted Investment Program. 
27/02/09 Citigroup  US Treasury to convert into common equity up to $25 bn of Citi’s 
preferred shares issued under the Capital Purchase Program. 
After the transaction the US government will own approximately 
36% of Citi’s common stock.  
02/03/09 AIG  Restructuring of the Treasury’s and Fed’s assistance. Treasury 
will exchange its existing $40 bn of cumulative perpetual 
preferred shares for new non-cumulative preferred shares with 
features closer to common equity.  
New equity capital facility: up to $30 bn by issuance of non-
cumulative preferred stock to the Treasury. Restructuring of the 
Fed $60 bn credit facility: 1) up to $26 bn of preferred stock of two 
AIG insurance subsidiaries to be transferred to the Fed; 2) Fed 
loans, up to approximately $8.5 bn, to special purpose vehicles 
created by domestic life insurance subsidiaries of AIG. In return, 
the outstanding balance of the credit facility will be reduced to no 
less than $25 bn. 
Europe 
30/07/07 IKB  The German bank IKB is provided a €8.1 bn liquidity facility by its 
main shareholder, the German public bank KfW. 
09/08/07 BNP  Paribas  BNP Paribas suspends subscriptions and redemptions of three 
funds exposed to US asset-backed securities. 
26/08/07 Sachsen  LB  The state of Saxony sells Sachsen LB to Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg (LBBW). Sachsen LB had been granted a liquidity 
facility (up to €17.1 bn) by other Landesbanken and receives a 
€2.75 bn guarantee by the state of Saxony in the context of the sale 
to LBBW. 
14/09/07 Northern  Rock The Bank of England provides liquidity support to Northern Rock. 
The company suffers the first bank run in the UK since 1866. 
17/09/07  Northern Rock  Government guarantee on Northern Rock’s existing deposits. 
17/02/08 Northern  Rock The government takes Northern Rock into temporary public 
ownership. 
11/07/08 Roskilde  Bank  Unlimited liquidity facility granted by the Danish central bank to 
Roskilde Bank. Up to DKK 750 mln guarantee by a private 
association set up by the Danish Bankers’ Association, to cover any 
potential losses on the central bank liquidity facility; the Danish 
state provides unlimited guarantee on further losses. 
24/08/08 Roskilde  Bank  The Danish central bank and the Danish Bankers’ Association take 
over all assets and liabilities of Roskilde Bank to facilitate its 
orderly winding-up. 
29/09/08 Roskilde  Bank  Large part of Roskilde Bank branches sold to Nordea, Spar Nord 
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29/09/08 Fortis  €11.2 bn capital injection into Fortis bank institutions by Belgium 
(€4.7 bn), the Netherlands (€4 bn) and Luxembourg (€2.5 bn).  
29/09/08  Bradford & 
Bingley 
Bradford & Bingley's business taken into public ownership. 
Bradford & Bingley's retail deposit business and its branch 
network transferred to Abbey National plc. 
30/09/08 Dexia  The governments of Belgium and France and existing shareholders 
of Dexia subscribe a capital increase of €3 bn each. The 
government of Luxembourg invests €376 mln in convertible bonds 
of Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg S.A. 
03/10/08 Fortis  The Netherlands take over the Dutch Fortis division assets, 
including Fortis' interests in ABN Amro (€16.8 bn). This 
transaction substitutes the €4 bn investment in Fortis Bank 
Nederland Holding N.V. previously announced. 
06/10/08 Fortis  The Belgian state raises to 100% its shareholding of Fortis Banque 
Belgium with a second €4.7 bn capital injection; it also transfers 
75% of Fortis Banque Belgium to BNP Paribas in exchange for new 
shares in BNP. BNP will also acquire 100% of Fortis Insurance 
Belgium and 16% of Fortis Banque Luxembourg from the 
Luxembourg State, taking its controlling interest in the bank to 
6 7 % .  A  F o r t i s  p o r t f o l i o  o f  s t r u c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s  ( €  1 0 . 4  b n )  t o  b e 
transferred to a vehicle held by Belgium (24%), BNP Paribas (10%) 
Fortis Group (66%). 
06/10/08  Hypo Real 
Estate 
The German authorities and the finance sector agree to provide 
financial support to Hypo Real Estate (€50 bn liquidity facility; €35 
bn guaranteed by the German government). 
07/10/08  Glitnir, 
Landsbanki 
The Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority takes control of 
Glitnir and Landsbanki. 
08/10/08 Central  banks  Coordinated interest rate cut of 50 b.p. by the Bank of England, 
European Central Bank, Swedish Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, 
Federal Reserve, Bank of Canada. 
09/10/08 Kaupthing  The Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority takes control of 
Kaupthing. 
13/10/08  RBS, HBOS, 
Lloyds TSB 
£37 bn Tier 1 capital investment by the UK government in RBS 
and, upon successful merger, HBOS and Lloyds TSB.  
16/10/08  European 
Central Bank 
€5 bn credit line to Hungary to cover Hungarian banks’ acute 
shortage of euro. 
16/10/08 UBS  Transfer of up to $60 bn of illiquid assets of UBS to an SPV owned 
by the Swiss central bank and funded by UBS (up to $6 bn) and the 
central bank (up to $54 bn). UBS to raise CHF6 bn of new capital in 
the form of mandatory convertible notes, fully placed with the 
Swiss Confederation. 
19/10/08 ING  The Dutch government subscribes €10 bn in non-voting core Tier 1 
capital. 
20/10/08 Ethias  The Belgian government announces a €1.5 bn capital injection into 86 | DI NOIA AND MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
Date Description 
the insurance and banking group Ethias. 
26/10/08 Carnegie  The Swedish investment bank Carnegie obtains a SEK1 bn loan 
from Swedish central bank.  
27/10/08 KBC  The Belgian bancassurance group K B C  t o  i s s u e  € 3 . 5  b n  o f  n o n -
transferable, non-voting core-capital securities to the Belgian State. 
28/10/08 Carnegie  Further SEK1.4 bn loan and SEK5 bn credit facility provided to 
Carnegie by the Swedish central bank.  
28/10/08 Aegon  The Dutch government injects €3 bn of core capital into the 
insurance group Aegon. 
06/11/08  European 
Central Bank 
Interest rate on the main refinancing operations cut from 3.75% to 
3.25%. 
06/11/08  Bank of 
England 
Official Bank Rate cut from 4.5% to 3%. 
10/11/08 Carnegie  The Swedish government takes control of Carnegie, granting a 
l o a n  o f  S E K 2 . 4  b n ,  w i t h  a n  o p t i o n a l  i n c r e a s e  t o  S E K 5  b n .  T h e  
agreement substitutes the previous loan offered by the central 
bank.  
10/11/08 Parex  Banka  The Latvian government nationalises Parex Banka, the largest 
independent Latvian Bank. 
13/11/08 SNS  REAAL  The Dutch bancassurance group SNS REAAL issues €750 mln of 
non-voting core Tier 1 securities to the Dutch State. 
04/12/08  European 
Central Bank 
Interest rate on the main refinancing operations cut from 3.25% to 
2.5%. 
04/12/08  Bank of 
England 
Official Bank Rate cut from 3% to 2%. 
22/12/08 IKB  SoFFin places an up to €5 bn guarantee on new bonds issued by 
IKB. 
08/01/09  Bank of 
England 
Official Bank Rate cut from 2% to 1.5%. 
08/01/09 Commerzbank De facto nationalisation of Commerzbank: the government injects 
€10 bn of capital and becomes the major shareholder with a stake 
of 25% + 1 share.  
14/01/09 Deutsche  Bank Deutsche Post, part-owned by the German state, is announced to 
acquire a shareholding of approximately 8% in Deutsche Bank. 
15/01/09  European 
Central Bank 
Interest rate on the main refinancing operations cut from 2.5% to 
2%. 
15/01/09  Anglo Irish 
Bank 
The Irish government nationalises Anglo Irish Bank. 
19/01/09 RBS  Conversion of the government’s preference shares investment in 
RBS into ordinary shares. 
26/01/09 ING  Government guarantee on an ING €27.7 bn portfolio of residential 
mortgage-backed securities. 
02/02/09 Fortis  BNP Paribas, the Belgian state and Fortis Holding amend the 
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opposed to the planned 100%, in Fortis Insurance Belgium. The 
BNP stake in the structured products vehicle is raised to 11.6% 
(58.8% for the Belgian government and 29.6% for Fortis Holding). 
05/02/09  Bank of 
England 
Official Bank Rate cut from 1.5% to 1%. 
11/02/09  Hypo Real 
Estate 
T o t a l  a m o u n t  o f  g u a r a n t e e s  p r o v i d e d  t o  H y p o  R e  b y  S o F F i n  
reaches €52 bn. Total amount of government support to the group 
rises to €102 bn. 
26/02/09 RBS  UK Treasury to subscribe £13 bn of Core Tier 1 capital of RBS. RBS 
participates to the government asset protection scheme for £325 bn 
of assets and will absorb first losses up to £19.5 bn; further losses 
will be borne 90% by the Treasury and 10% by RBS. 
05/03/09  European 
Central Bank 
Interest rate on the main refinancing operations cut from 2% to 
1.5%. 
05/03/09  Bank of 
England 
Official Bank Rate cut from 1% to 0.5%. 
07/03/09  Lloyds Banking 
Group 
The UK Treasury nationalises the Lloyds Banking Group through 
the conversion into new ordinary shares of the £4 bn of preference 
shares that it holds. The Group will also place £260bn of assets into 
the government’s Asset Protection Scheme, paying a £15.6 bn fee; 
the fee’s proceeds will be used by the Treasury to subscribe core 
Tier 1 capital of the Group. Overall, Treasury’s ordinary 
shareholding could reach 77%.   
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